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1. PREVIEW 
Technical and technological change^ has probably been one of the major influ­
ences on the nature of the human life and can have an impact on welfare, economic 
indicators, social structures, and society. Thus, this wide topic has been studied 
not only by economists but by sociologists, geographers, management scientists, and 
others. 
The primary focus of the early economic studies on technical and technological 
change was simply to investigate the impact of technical change on output, growth, 
employment, and income distribution. That is, technical change itself was treated 
as an exogenous rather than an endogenous variable. Since the 1960s, however, 
economists have attempted to explore the economic determinants of technical change. 
This theory is referred to as induced innovation. 
Despite the abundance of literature that is available in this area, previous studies 
may not have captured the full impact of uncertainty and risk. To date, the possibility 
of a link between uncertainty and the bias of technical change has not been examined 
^Perhaps one ought to distinguish between technical change and technological 
change, the former being an improvement of an existing technique and the latter an 
addition of a new technique to the existing spectrum (Elster, 1983, p. 95). In most 
of the literature, however, the distinction between the two terms is not made. Thus, 
we do not distinguish between these two terminologies in this study. 
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thoroughly. Intuitively, it would appear that such a link should exist. Therefore, the 
first issue examined in this study is how uncertainty in markets or in production may 
affect the factor bias of technical change. 
Adoption and diffusion of technological innovations have been topics of consid­
erable interest among economists because an economy can not be affected in any 
material way by new technologies until the use or ownership of those technologies is 
widespread. In agriculture, this topic has attracted considerable attention because 
new technologies seem to offer an opportunity to substantially increase production 
and income. 
There is a large body of literature on the effects of government price stabiliza­
tion programs on producer and consumer welfare and on economic indicators in the 
agricultural sector. However, to our knowledge, no one has examined how those pro­
grams affect the type of technologies that are adopted or the rate of diffusion of new 
technologies. That there should be some relationship between price variability and 
technological adoption is clear. Thus, the second issue of this study is to discover the 
relationship between price variability (risk) and technology adoption (diffusion). 
The dissertation is written with the objective of contributing to the development 
of the theory on technical change and technology adoption. These two issues are 
analyzed to derive the relationship between uncertainty (risk) and technical change 
and technology adoption. In addition, some policy implications related to risk and 
uncertainty are discussed. 
The plan of this study is as follows. A brief review of the theory of technical 
change and the technology adoption models is given in Chapter 2. This chapter 
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begins with neoclassical theory to explain technical change as just another instance 
of maximization under constraints.^ Technology adoption models are also discussed. 
Chapter 3 considers the factor bias of technical change under price uncertainty. 
The first section involves an introduction and a problem statement. An Ito control 
model is proposed, and the basic assumptions upon which the analysis is based are 
discussed. Subsequent sections examine the factor bias of technical change with uncer­
tainty in input prices, output price, and output price and an input price. Concluding 
comments are given in the last section of Chapter 3. 
The results of Chapter 3 indicate that, under input price uncertainty, if the 
elasticity of substitution is greater than one, technical change will be biased toward 
the input that has the more certain price. Output price uncertainty has no effect 
on the direction of technical change bias but has an effect on the degree of technical 
change bias. If the output price and an input price are assumed to be uncertain, 
the correlation between the two stochastic processes will play an important role in 
the factor bias of technical change. Assuming that the elasticity of substitution is 
greater than one, if input price and output price are highly and positively correlated, 
technical change will be biased toward the input that has an uncertain price. On the 
other hand, if they are insignificantly or negatively correlated, technical change will 
be biased toward the input that has a certain price. It is also shown that Hicks's 
induced innovation proposition may be derived for the deterministic case or the case 
of risk neutrality. 
^There are some other theories that have been used to explain technical change. 
They are said to be Schumpeter's theories, evolutionary theories, and Marxist theories 
(see Els ter, 1983, pp. 112-184). 
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In Chapter 4, the bias of technical change is examined in the presence of pro­
duction uncertainty. It is shown that, if the elasticity of substitution is greater than 
one, technical progress will be biased toward risk-reducing inputs and against risk-
increasing inputs. Another important result provided in this chapter is that the 
degree of technical change bias would be increased as riskiness increases or as the 
firm becomes more risk averse. 
In Chapter 5, the model is extended to introduce hedging or forward contracts. It 
is assumed that firms may also participate in the forward markets to reduce risk from 
output price uncertainty. The results indicate that, under output price uncertainty, 
the existence of a forward market has no effect on the direction of technical change 
bias but has an effect on the degree of bias. If uncertainty exists both in output price 
and input price and the forward market is unbiased, technical progress will be biased 
toward the input which has a certain price. Concluding comments and some policy 
implications are discussed in the last section of Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 deals with the issue of price uncertainty and technology adoption. The 
first section contains an introduction and a motivation. In the subsequent sections, 
the definitions are given to categorize new technologies, the relationship between 
price variability and technology adoption and technological change is examined, and 
an adjustment cost is introduced to explain the dynamic path and the relationship 
between the speed of diffusion and price variability. The last section of Chapter 6 
provides a summary and concluding comments. 
The results of Chapter 6 show that a higher level of price variability will be one 
reason for variable-input-saving technological change. On the other hand, a lower 
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level of price variability will lead to variable-input-using technological change. It is 
also shown that a higher level of price variability would be associated with a lower 
(higher) speed of diffusion for yield-increasing (cost-reducing) technology. An impor­
tant implication that can be drawn from this chapter is that the introduction of a 
price stabilization policy will encourage producers to adopt yield-increasing technolo­
gies, whereas the removal of one of these schemes will increase the development and 
adoption of cost-reducing technologies. 
Chapter 7 presents a short summary of the general results and policy impli­
cations of this study. Itô differentiation and dynamic programming for a vector of 
state equations, and the relationship between the bias of technical change and factor 
augmentation are briefly discussed in the Appendix. 
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2. A REVIEW OF THE BIAS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE AND 
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 
2.1 Neoclassical Theories of the Factor Bias of Technical Change 
2.1.1 The production function approach 
The fundamental neoclassical tool for the study of technical change is the notion 
of a production function that designates a quantitative relation between inputs and 
outputs. We might postulate production as a process with many inputs and one 
output.^ The standard neoclassical approach assumes that there are two inputs: 
labor and aggregate capital. Furthermore, all the information in the production 
function is assumed to be conveyed by the iso-quant, which is stated as the locus of 
factor combinations that give the same output. 
The neoclassical theory of production accepts the concept that the firm adopts a 
factor combination that maximizes its net revenue or profit. This concept also implies 
cost minimization for a fixed output level. That is, under perfect competition, the 
firm chooses the point on the unit iso-quant that lies on the lowest iso-cost curve. 
Therefore, a change in the factor price ratio will force the firm to convert from one 
^The production process may be understood in several ways because inputs and 
outputs can be regarded as points or flows. 
factor combination to the other. This conversion is called the substitution effect. 
In this framework, technical progress might be defined as a shift of the unit iso-
quant toward the origin. The rate of technical change is defined as the relative change 
in total unit costs when the techniques in each period are those that would minimize 
unit costs when factor prices are constant. The biases of technical change can be 
measured by the relative change in the factor ratio when factor prices are constant 
(Salter, 1960, p. 30). 
Neoclassical theories can illustrate technical change in terms of rational choice 
within constraints. This fact suggests that the rate and the bias of technical change 
should result from a considered choice by the firm. 
2.1.2 The factor bias of technical change 
2.1.2.1 Definitions The bias of technical change can be defined in terms of 
proportional change in the capital-labor ratio at constant factor prices (Salter, 1960). 
O  S ( K I L )  1 
= -WkJÎ' 
Technical change is labor saving if Bi > 0, neutral if Bi = 0, and capital saving if 
< 0. 
A labor-saving (capital-using) innovation makes labor more plentiful relative to 
capital than it was previously, with the result that the marginal product (MP) of labor 
should fall relative to that of capital. Because the equilibria require that the ratio of 
marginal products be equal to the ratio of factor prices, this change is equivalent to a 
rise in the price of capital relative to that of labor. According to this explanation, the 
bias of technical change may again be defined in terms of the proportional change in 
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the ratio of marginal products at a constant factor ratio (Thirtle and Rut tan, 1987, 
p. 15). 
2 St F^/F,-
Binswanger (1978) showed that Bi is actually equal to B2 multiplied by the elasticity 
of substitution. 
If, at constant factor prices, the ratio of capital to labor increases, the ratio of 
the capital share relative to that of labor must also increase. This result implies that 
technical change must be labor saving if the capital share increases, neutral if capital 
and labor shares remain constant, and capital saving if the relative capital share falls. 
Thus, the bias of technical change can be defined in terms of proportional change in 
the share at constant factor prices (Binswanger, 1974b, p. 964). 
where is the share of factor i. This definition has the advantage that it leads to a 
single measure of bias for each factor in the multi-factor case. 
2.1.2.2 Source of technical change bias The orthodox explanation for 
the source of the factor bias of technical change is that the bias is the result of a 
change in the relative prices of the factors. A relatively low price of capital (labor) 
leads to capital-using (labor-using) innovations. The pioneer statement of this view 
is found in Hicks's proposition: 
The real reason for the predominance of labour-saving inventions is surely 
that which was hinted at in our discussion of substitution. A change in the 
relative prices of the factors of production is itself a spur to invention, and 
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to invention of a particular kind-directed to economizing the use of a factor 
which has become relatively more expensive. The general tendency to a 
more rapid increase of capital than labour which has marked European 
history during the last few centuries has naturally provided a stimulus to 
labour-saving invention. (Hicks, 1963, p. 125) 
Labor-saving (capital-saving) innovations seem to be the rational response of 
firms to rising (decreasing) wages. However, Elster (1983) has suggested that the 
Hicksian proposition might have "an easily committed logical fallacy." That is, if firms 
act collectively, the Hicksian proposition may explain the bias of technical change. 
But, of course, entrepreneurs act individually, not collectively, and so the proposed 
explanation fails. Assuming that a firm must pay a cost for innovations, it will face a 
"Prisoners' Dilemma"; i.e., it is better for all firms if all firms act collectively than if 
none does so, but it is tempting for the individual firm to detect and to benefit from 
inventions undertaken by the others without making a contribution itself to a public 
good (Elster, 1983, p. 102). Therefore, Hicks's proposition may not explain rational 
behavior of the individual firm because of this external effect. 
Two models that would make individual firm behavior rational have been pro­
posed by Fellner (1961). The first model drops the assumption of perfect competition. 
Assuming that imperfect competition exists, the firm can fully internalize the benefit 
of innovation. The second model is a learning mechanism. The firm may learn from 
past experience. For example, a past trend of rising wages will cause the firm to 
search for labor-saving innovations. 
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Another approach to explaining rational choice of factor bias in technical change 
was proposed by Kennedy (1964). He assumes that, at any given time, the firm faces 
an innovation possibility frontier that imposes constraints on technically possible 
innovations.^ And the frontier should relate the proportion of one factor that could 
be saved to the proportion saved of the other factor. However, this approach does 
not give us any reason to believe that the innovation possibility frontier has a reality 
for the firm. The theory assumes that the innovations will occur at the point of the 
frontier that, at the ruling factor prices, permits the greatest reduction in unit cost. 
However, this assumption does not tell how the firm is supposed to find the frontier 
and move along it. That is, this theory rests on dubious microeconomic foundations 
(Nordhaus, 1973, p. 218). 
A pioneering attempt to have a microeconomic foundation was the work of 
Kamien and Schwartz (1969). In their analysis, the question of endogenous factor-
augmenting technical change in the context of the profit-maximizing firm was ad­
dressed. They apply Kennedy's innovation possibility frontier and assume that the 
rate of impact of factors and the rate of output are instantaneously variable and factor 
augmentations are determined at the level at which the revenue is maximized. Under 
these assumptions, Kamien and Schwartz proved that the technical change of the firm 
will asymptotically approach Hicks neutral if the elasticity of factor substitution is 
less than one. 
Binswanger (1974b) has developed an induced innovation model incorporating 
a research production frontier. By assuming decreasing marginal productivity of 
^This approach is called the Kennedy-Weiseker-Samuelson innovation possibility 
frontier. 
11 
resources in applied research and development, he constructed a model of induced 
factor-saving technical change based on the profit-maximizing behavior of the firm 
without the assumption of a fixed research budget (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985, p. 87). 
More recently, Sato and Ramachandran (1987) have shown a profit-maximizing 
firm that, faced with differential increases in input prices, could develop compensating 
cost-reducing technologies. They have also proven the Hicksian proposition for a 
monopolistic firm with an infinite time horizon. 
Another approach to explaining technical change is the theory of induced institu­
tional change, which was developed by Hayami and Ruttan (1971). The importance 
of institutional change can be stressed because many technical changes, especially in 
agriculture, have been produced by public sector institutions. 
2.2 The Measurement of Technical Change Biases 
The measurement of technical change biases have generally proceeded in two 
directions. One is the parametric measures that are obtained from direct specifica­
tion and estimation of production technology via production, cost, or profit function 
approaches. The other is nonparametric measures that attempt to investigate the 
consistency between theoretical constraints of production analysis and observed pro­
duction behavior. 
The pioneering works in the parametric approach were conducted by David and 
van de Klundert (1965), Sato (1970), and Lianos (1971). All these studies used value-
added functions in two-factor models to measure technical change biases. 
Binswanger (1974a) proposed a method of measuring the bias of technical change 
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with multiple factors of production. Technical change biases were measured by es­
timating a system of cost share equations derived from a homothetic transcendental 
logarithmic cost function. The changes in cost shares not explained by price changes 
were interpreted as measurements of the technological change biases. Even though 
this method was applied to a number of analyses, a severe restriction is homothetic 
technology. If the technology is nonhomothetic, changes in factor cost shares stem 
from output changes, scale changes, input price changes, or biased technical changes 
(Berndt and Khaled, 1979). 
A model designed to test for technological advancement, factor-input, and scale 
bias was developed by Stevenson (1980). He asserted that technological change may 
be biased with regard both to the factor inputs and to the scale characteristics of the 
production process (Stevenson, 1980, p. 162). 
Weaver (1983) developed an estimation method that was particularly attractive 
for study of multiple-output, multiple-input technologies. Technological change biases 
were measured by using the transcendental logarithmic form of the expected profit 
function. 
Antle (1984) estimated profit share equations derived from transcendental loga­
rithmic profit function by using aggregate time-series data for pre-war and post-World 
War II periods. A time trend was used to represent technological change, and the ef­
fects of the time trend on equilibrium factor cost shares was interpreted as a measure 
of technological change biases. This work found different average biases in the pre-
and post-World War II periods and concluded that the differences were consistent 
with the induced innovation hypothesis. 
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A problem for the analysis of technical change was suggested by Antle (1986). 
He showed that tlie structures of microeconomic and aggregate production models are 
different. The process that generates aggregate output depends on the information 
that firms use to form expectations, whereas the process that generates individual 
firm's output does not. Therefore, aggregate data can be used to measure and ex­
plain technological change only if sufficient identifying restrictions are imposed on the 
econometric model (Antle, 1986). 
A common method used in the parametric approach is to specify a cost function 
or profit function. This method, however, can be valid if the true cost function or 
profit function is a member of the parametric class considered; otherwise the inference 
may be biased. Gallant (1981, 1982) and Chalfant and Gallant (1985) addressed the 
question of functional form and found that Fourier series approximations that may 
be globally flexible are appropriate. Thus, the use of Fourier form may merit further 
study in the parametric approach. 
The second direction of the measurement of technical change biases is the non-
parametric analysis that has the advantage of not being dependent on a particular 
form of production technology. Early works by Hanoch and Rothschild (1972) pro­
vided a foundation for examining the productive efficiency exhibited by observed 
behavior prior to estimation of parametric models. And, recently, Varian (1984) 
extended this work. 
Chavas and Cox (1988a) extended the nonparametric approach of production de­
cisions developed by Hanoch and Rothschild (1972) and Varian (1984) to incorporate 
output-augmenting technical change. This approach was empirically implemented 
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with a standard linear programming algorithm. Following the analysis, Chavas and 
Cox {1988b) extended the nonparametric production analysis so that it incorporates 
both Hicks-neutral and biased technical change. 
An important point in the measurement of technical change biases was mentioned 
by Diamond, McFadden, and Rodriguez (1978). They showed the nonidentifiability 
of the elasticities of substitution and the bias of technical change. That is, one may 
not be able to identify simultaneously the elasticities of factor substitution and the 
bias of technical change in the absence of prior information. Depending on the data 
and o priori hypothesis about the structure of technical change, the measurement of 
technical change biases may be exactly identified, identified up to a range of indeter-
mining, or not identified at all (Diamond, McFadden, and Rodriguez, 1978). Neither 
the parametric approach nor the nonparametric approach solves the nonidentifiabil­
ity problem directly. However, this problem could be circumvented by using prior 
information. 
2.3 Technology Adoption and Diffusion 
2.3.1 Theoretical development 
2.3.1.1 Probit model approach The adoption of new technology is viewed 
as a function of the characteristics of firms at one point in time in the static probit 
and logit approaches. If the exogenous "stimulus" variables that explain adoption 
behavior change over time, then an increasing proportion of the population will cross 
the "threshold" and adopt new technology (Thirtle and Ruttan, 1987, p. 108). A 
diffusion curve can be derived from these dynamic probit models. 
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Even though this probit model approach has been used in durable good, demand 
analyses, David (1969) rationalized and applied this approach to production process 
innovations. More recently, a major advance was made by Davies (1979). His model 
has the advantage of explaining post-innovation technological improvements that are 
attributed to learning by doing. 
2.3.1.2 Learning by doing approach This approach has been extended 
since Mansfield's seminal work (1966), which did not present any real theoretical 
justification for the inclusion of variables such as the expected profitability of a change 
in technology, the size of a firm, and a firm's liquidity. 
In both Stoneman (1981) and Linder, Fischer, and Pardey (1979), a model of 
technology diffusion was constructed in which firms learn in a Bayesian fashion from 
their experience (Stoneman, 1983, p. 77). Stoneman (1981) showed that the intrafirm 
rate of diffusion of the new technology may follow the sigmoid pattern, assuming that 
the new technology entails adjustment cost. Feder and O'Mara (1982) formulated an 
aggregate innovation diffusion model based on the assumption that individual farmers 
revise their beliefs in a Bayesian fashion. 
Jensen (1982) developed a decision-theoretic model of individual firm adoption 
behavior, which might be used to derive an expected diffusion curve. The approach 
used was to view adoption as a problem of decision making under uncertainty when 
learning might occur. The conclusion is that if firms do not know whether an innova­
tion is profitable they may delay adoption in order to gather information and reduce 
this uncertainty. 
Jensen (1983) assumed that firms face a choice between two innovations without 
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knowing which of the two is better and that firms have a priori information that 
one of the innovations is better, which is updated by Bayes' rule as trials with the 
innovations are made. An expected diffusion curve for the better innovation could be 
derived as an ogive shape. 
2.3.1.3 Game theoretic approach Recently, the problem of the timing 
of adoption in duopoly models has attracted renewed attention. Reinganum (1981a, 
1981b) showed that strategic behavior alone can lead to a Nash equilibrium of different 
adoption dates and can have a diffusion curve. This concept is demonstrated in a 
duopoly model (Reinganum, 1981a) and an oligopoly model (Reinganum, 1981b). 
The results also indicated that an increase in the number of firms can delay adoption 
of new technology. 
2.3.2 Agricultural adoption studies 
In the agricultural economic literature,^ land allocation between technologies 
and the input-land ratio of modern inputs under different circumstances have been 
analyzed. Risk and farm size are the most important variables in land allocation 
between technologies i 
Hiebert (1974) examined the effect of uncertainty resulting from imperfect in­
formation on the decision to adopt fertilizer-responsive seed varieties. The results 
indicated that additional information and the enhanced ability to decode information 
increase the likelihood of technology adoption. This analysis is consistent with the 
0 
A good summary on the adoption of agricultural innovations is provided in Feder, 
Just, and Zilberman (1985). 
analyses of Nelson and Phelps (1966), Welch (1970), and Kislev and Shchori-Bachrach 
(1973). Feder (1980) assumed that uncertainty is associated only with a new crop 
(technology) and showed that the land-allocation decision between the old and new 
crops depends on the relationship between relative risk aversion and income. This 
analysis was also consistent with Hiebert's (1974) findings. 
More recently, Just and Zilberman (1983) extended the land-allocation decision 
with all inputs. Their results demonstrated that the levels of modern inputs used de­
pends on whether the modern inputs are risk reducing or risk increasing and whether 
relative risk aversion is increasing or decreasing. In addition, the results also indi­
cated that the stochastic relationship of returns per hectare under the traditional 
and modern technologies plays a large role in determining the role of farm size in 
technology adoption. 
Another approach of the static analysis is the "safety-first" type of models that 
assume that the utility of income is zero below a specific level and one above that level. 
Bell (1972) showed that this specific level is positively related to the farmer's wealth. 
Roumasset (1976) demonstrated that nonadoption of new high-yielding varieties may 
be the result of a higher disaster-level yield probabilities associated with high-yielding 
varieties in rain-fed crops. 
The adoption models that have been surveyed thus far consider adoption of a 
single innovation. However, modern technologies may be introduced as a package 
with several components. Feder (1982) examined adoption decisions involving two 
interrelated agricultural technology innovations: One was neutral to scale, the other 
was a lumpy innovation with capital. The results indicated that adoption behavior 
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depends on the degree of complementarity between two technological innovations 
and on a binding constraint. Byerlee and de Polanco (1986) examined the stepwise 
adoption of technological packages empirically by using on-farm experimental and 
survey data. 
2.3.2.1 Limitations Even though the adoption models in the agricultural 
economic literature might well be useful, there are some limitations that must be 
solved. First, yields are the only random variables in most analytical models of adop­
tion behavior under uncertainty. In reality, output and input prices also may be 
random variables, and their uncertainty may affect technological choices and adop­
tion. Some of the implications of output-price uncertainty on adoption behavior can 
be deduced from models with yield uncertainties by interpreting yield functions as 
revenue functions (Feder, Just, and Zilberman, 1985). 
Second, the nonexistence of government agricultural policies in most adoption 
models is troublesome. For example, price stabilization schemes will affect the type 
of technologies that are adopted or the rate of diffusion of new technologies because 
these schemes may remove the risk that is related to the adoption of a technology. 
Price support schemes, food taxes and subsidies, and input and output quotas may 
also affect diffusion processes. 
Third, most adoption researches have thus far viewed the adoption decision in di-
chotomous terms (adoption or nonadoption). However, an interesting question might 
be related to the intensity of use (e.g., the percentage of land that is planted to 
high-yielding varieties). 
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Finally, most analytical models consider yield-increasing^ technologies such as 
high-yielding varieties. However, these models may not explain the technology inno­
vation that reduces the average variable cost per hectare (cost-reducing technologies) 
because these are different concepts for a risk-averse firm whose utility function is non­
linear in wealth (concave). Further studies should rectify this problem by properly 
differentiating technologies. 
^The definitions of yield-increasing and cost-reducing technologies are presented 
in Chapter 6. 
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3. THE FACTOR BIAS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE UNDER PRICE 
UNCERTAINTY 
3.1 Introduction 
Economists have long believed that relative prices play an important role in 
economic progress. Hicks (1963) proposed that technological or technical innovations 
are the result of a change in the relative prices of the production factors. This proposal 
is referred to as the induced innovation theory. The theory has been modeled in 
microeconomic terms and tested empirically.^ 
Although models of this type may be useful descriptively and empirically, they 
may not capture the essential features of uncertainty that can affect the rate and bias 
of technical change. To date, the possibility of a link between uncertainty and the 
bias of technical change has not been examined. Intuitively, it seems that such a link 
should exist. The adoption of any particular innovation involves risk. One would 
imagine that the decision to develop and adopt an innovation would depend on the 
degree of uncertainty and risk to the producer. It has not always been possible to 
^See, for example, Antle (1984, 1986), Binswanger (1974a, 1974b, 1978), Fellner 
(1961), Hayami and Ruttan (1985), Kamien and Schwartz (1969, 1982), Kennedy 
(1964), Nordhaus (1973), Sato (1970), Sato and Ramachandran (1987), Sato and 
Suzawa (1983), and Stevenson (1980). 
explain why certain technologies have been developed and adopted in one country or 
region and not in another. Relative prices of factors are, of course, important in this 
process but may not be the only determining factor. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the effects of price uncertainty on the 
bias of technical change. The results will show that, under input price uncertainty, 
assuming the same rates of growth of input prices and assuming a risk-averse firm, 
technical change will be biased toward the inputs that have the less variable prices 
if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one. The direction of technical change 
bias will not be affected by output price uncertainty, but the degree of bias will be 
influenced. The correlation between input prices and output price will affect the bias 
of technical change. Assuming input and output price uncertainty, technical change 
will be biased toward inputs whose prices are negatively or slightly positively related 
to output price if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one. 
Because technical change is assumed to be based on the stock of accumulated 
technical knowledge, a dynamic model is developed in the following section. This 
model must, of necessity, be stochastic; consequently, we use I to calculus to de­
velop a stochastic control model that contains endogenous factor-augmenting techni­
cal change. 
In the next section, an Itô control model is proposed and the basic assumptions 
upon which the analysis will be based are described. In subsequent sections, the 
effect of uncertainty on technical change in only the input prices, in only the output 
price, and in both the output price and one input price are analyzed. The last section 
provides concluding remarks. 
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3.2 The Basic Model 
Assuming the presence of factor-augmenting technical change, the production 
function can be written as 
Y{t) = f [A(t)A-i(<), 
where F[,] is assumed to be a difFerentiable quasi-concave function, Xi{t) and ^^2(0 
are the levels of two inputs at time t, and j4(i) and B{t) represent the levels of factor 
augmentation at time t. 
It is assumed that a representative firm can fully internalize the benefits from its 
research.^ This assumption limits the analysis to those firms that can obtain patents 
or to government-sponsored research programs that conduct research on problems 
specific to the domestic environment. A less formal interpretation would allow us 
to view the research that ensues as that which would be desired by those firms that 
ultimately use the proceeds of the research. If these firms signal researchers via market 
forces or the political process, then research programs should reflect the desires of 
these end users in a manner that is consistent with the assumption. 
We also assume that the firm finances all its research internally and that the levels 
of research expenditure as a proportion of total revenue, e^PY, determine the rate of 
^If we do not assume full internalization, there will be an economic externality; 
that is, an individual firm can do nothing to capture the benefits of technical change 
through that firm's own behavior. A very common assumption in the industrial 
organization literature on endogenous technical progress is a noncompetitive market 
structure (Sato and Ramachandran, 1987). However, for simplicity, this study does 
not assume a noncompetitive market. 
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increase of A{t) and B{t) according to the following technical progress functions:^ 
dA = Ahi{eiPY)dt, and (3.1) 
dB = Bh2{e2PY)dt, 
where and ^2(0 assumed to be continuous and twice difFerentiable, > 
0 > , P is the output price, and is the endogenously determined rate of research 
investment. 
Suppose that the firm maximizes the expected discounted utility of the terminal 
state variables {W, A, and B) such that 
J(So) = Max £;[e-^V(5y)|5o = sq], (3.2) 
where J represents the indirect utility function resulting from the optimization, S 
denotes a vector of state variables (Tf, A, and B), r is the rate of firm's time prefer­
ence, T is the terminal time, and V(.) represents the utility function of terminal state 
variables. Because we assume that the firm may sell not only its wealth but also the 
factor augmentation or accumulated information (A and B) at the terminal time, the 
firm's indirect utility function depends on all state variables. 
The firm's wealth is assumed to consist of an inventory of risk-free assets, L, 
valued at the market price, Pj^ (negative L denotes liabilities), so that 
W = PiL. 
^This function represents the impact of research expenditure on the rate of change 
of factor augmentation. This model does not fully take into account the delayed or 
lag effects of the stocks of basic and applied knowledge on productivity gains. For 
a detailed discussion on the influences of basic and applied knowledge, see Sato and 
Suzawa (1983). 
24 
Assuming an inventory of risk-free assets whose market prices change over time, 
the change in wealth can be calculated by Itô's lemma as^ 
dW = LdP]^ 4- PjjdL + dPj^dL. (3.3) 
The change in wealth equals net income from all sources. The term LdPj^ represents 
capital gains on the current inventory of assets. The last two terms on the right-hand 
side of (3.3) are the net value of additions to wealth from sources other than capital 
gains (Merton, 1971). Furthermore, for simplicity, we assume that there are no risky 
assets and no consumption.® Thus, these two terms represent income or losses from 
production. This specification can be presented as 
{Pi -f dPi)dL — •ïïdt dir, 
where irdt 4- d-K is the realization of production income, Pj^ + dP^ is the price at 
which risk-free assets are purchased in the immediate future, and dL is the quantity 
of assets purchased. 
Therefore, the change in wealth equals capital gains or losses on the inventory of 
risk-free assets plus the realization of production income such that 
dW = LdPjj -f irdt + dir. (3.4) 
The price of risk-free assets is assumed to change as follows: 
(3-5) 
^See (8.2) in the Appendix. 
®For a detailed discussion on the portfolio and consumption, see Merton (1971). 
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where 8j^ is the known growth rate for the price of risk-free assets. Therefore, the 
change in the firm's wealth can be represented as 
dW = {8jW + •K)dt d-K. (3.6) 
Equations (3.1) through (3.6) comprise the basic framework. To analyze the ef­
fects of price uncertainty on the bias of technical change, some additional assumptions 
are required. These assumptions are specified in the sections that follow. 
3.3 Input Price Uncertainty 
We assume, that at the time of decision making, the output price and production 
level are known; however, the two input prices, P-^ and ^2» &re uncertain, and the 
•firm expects these prices to be log-normally distributed as 
dPi = PiÔ-^dt -j- P^cidzi, and 
dP2 = P282dt + P2cr2'^Z2, 
where is the forecast for the growth rate of the price of the input, <7^ is the 
standard deviation of the forecast, zj is a Wiener process in which E[dz^{t)] = 0, 
E[dzj^{t)^ = dt, and E[dz-^dz2] = 7i2> 7j^2 is the contemporaneous correlation 
coefficient between two stochastic processes. 
The firm chooses the levels of input use, Xi and the research expendi­
tures, ej and e2, at the beginning of each production period. The firm receives the 
known price per unit, f, at the end of each period. Expected production income at 
the initial time can, therefore, be written as 
7r = (1 — ei — £2)-^^ — (3.7) 
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If we stochastically differentiate this equation by using Itô's lemma [see (8.2) in the 
Appendix], we get 
d-K = —X-^dP-[^ — X2dP2 
= - ^2^2^21'^^ - [^1-^1 *^1 ; ^2^2^21 
dzi 
dz2 
The stochastic production income in the immediate future can be obtained by adding 
an expression representing irdt and by using the above equation such that 
irdt + dir = [(1 — — e.2)PY — P^X-^{1 + — ^2-^2(^ 4- ^2)]'^^ (3.8) 
dzi 
-[XiPi(Ti ; X2^2<^2] 
dz2 
By substituting (3.8) into (3.6), the accounting identity that is the change in the 
firm's wealth can be expressed as 
dW = [8iW+ {\-ei-€2)PY - PiXi[l+8i)-P2X2{l + S2)]dt (3.9) 
dzi 
-[XiPicri ; %2^2(^2] 
dzr 
The model specifies that the firm's objective is to maximize the expected dis­
counted utility of terminal stock of state variables, (3.2), subject to the accounting 
identity, (3.9), and technical progress constraints, (3.1), where the levels of input use, 
Xi and %2) the rates of research expenditures, and £2, are control and deci­
sion variables, and wealth, W, and factor augmentation, A and B, are the stock and 
state variables, respectively. 
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The Itô version of the Bellman equation® associated with this model specification 
may be derived as follows. 
•Jt = M^[Jyj{6iW + {l-€i-e2)PY-PiXi{l + 5i) 
-%(1 + h ) }  +  J A i ^ h i i e i P Y ) }  +  J B { B h 2 i e 2 P Y ) }  
(3.10) 
+ 2'^ww{-PlXi(Ti ; -P2^2^2) 
11 
\ 
712 
/ 
^ 712 1 ] 
-PlXi^i 
-P2^2^2 
where Ju> and Jww are, respectively, the first- and second-order derivatives with 
respect to wealth, and «7^ and Jq are the first-order derivatives with respect to A 
and B, respectively. 
The expression to be maximized is a dynamic certainty equivalent denominated 
in utils. For convenience, we can call this expression a stochastic Hamiltonian.^ The 
stochastic Hamilton!an and first-order conditions^ for Xj, X2, and €2 can be 
written as 
ff — -f- (1 — ei — €2)PY — PjXj(l + ^ i) — ^2-^2(^ 4" ^2)} 
+Jj^{AhiieiPY)} + JB{Bh2ie2PY)} 
+ 2'^wwi—PlXi(Ti ; —^2-^2(^2) 
/ 1 \ / 1 712 
712 1 / 
-Pi^m 
-i'2^2^2 
dH 
dXi 
— »7xo{(l — ej^ — e2)jPi^iA — i']^(l-f-5j)} +(3.11) 
-\-JBiA.Bh2e.2PF1} Jww{PiXi<T^ -f-PlcriP2-^2^27l2} = 0, 
®See the Itô version of the Bellman equation in the Appendix. 
^Malliaris and Brock (1982). 
^See (8.3) and (8.4) in the Appendix 
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^ = Jw{{l-tl-^2)PP2B-P2i^ + S2)} + JA{ABh[^lPF2} (3.12) 
+J^{B^h2e2PF2} + Jww{P2^2^2 + = 0, 
dH 
— = f} + F} = 0, and (3.13) 
F} + f} = 0, (3.14) dH 
062 
where Fi and F2 are the first-order derivatives with respect to AXi and BX2, and 
and ^2 are the first-order derivatives with respect to eiPY and respectively. 
Substituting (3.13) and (3.14) into (3.11) and (3.12) yields the following input 
decision rules: 
PFiA = Pi(l + «i)-^{PfA-i<T? + Pl<ri?2-Ï2"-2712}.^ni (3-15) 
Jw 
PF^B = P2{l^h)-^-^{PiX24^PlXinP2<'21uh (3-l«) 
t f y j  
If there is no uncertainty, i.e., (T j ^ = 0 and a2 = 0, then (3.15) and (3.16) indicate 
that the firm will apply inputs to the point at which their marginal-value-products 
equal their purchase prices. Because J denotes the indirect utility function resulting 
from optimization, — will be the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. 
For a risk-neutral firm, J is a linear function of wealth {Jww — 0); therefore, (3.15) 
and (3.16) will be identical to the deterministic case. For a risk-averse firm, is 
negative and the marginal risk premium is positive. In this case, (3.15) and (3.16) 
indicate that, if there is no correlation between input prices (7^2 = 0), a risk-averse 
firm will apply less inputs than will a risk-neutral firm. With a negative correlation 
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between dz-^ and dz2 (712 < 0), the marginal risk premium will be smaller and a 
risk-averse firm will, therefore, apply more inputs than it would in the case where no 
correlation exists between input prices. 
Combining (3.13) and (3.14) yields 
This equation indicates that the firm will allocate research expenditures, ei and eg, 
to the point at which the marginal utility of wealth, Jw, equals the marginal utility 
of A and B, times the stock level of A or F, times the first derivative of the technical 
progress function with respect to research expenditures. 
Partially differentiating (3.17) with respect to A, and B and Itô differentiating 
The changes in marginal indirect utility over time [see (8.5) in the Appendix], which 
(3.17) 
(3.17) yield 
Jww = JAw^^I ~ and 
Ah'^dJj^ = Bhi^dJ^. (3.19) 
(3.18) 
are also first-order conditions for the stochastic control model, can be written as^ 
— —[Jty{(l — — e2)Pi^|'Xj'} + Xj } (3.21) 
+JB{Bh'^4PF{Xl}]dt 
^ , and 
dz2 
^For a detailed explanation, refer to Malliaris and Brock (1982, pp. 108-113). 
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djQ — - ei - e2)PF2X2} + Jj^{Ah'-^e\PF2X2} 
dzi 
(3.22) 
-'^Bwl^l^l^l ; -^2^2^2] 
dzr 
where * represents the optimal value. Substituting (3.17), (3.18), (3.21), and (3.22) 
into (3.19) and simplifying yields 
[JwPF^X^Ah'^ + Jwhl]dt = [JwPF^X^Bh!^ + Jwh'^jdt. (3.23) * V-* DLf* 
Combining (3.1) and (3.23) gives 
B 
hi-h'^ = PF^BX^h'^ - PFlAXlh'^, (3.24) 
where A and B are the time rates of change, A = ^ and B = 
Substituting (3.15) and (3.16) into (3.24) yields an explicit equation that explains 
the relationship between technical change and input price uncertainty. 
À È 
B 
= P2(l + - Pl(l + «1 (3.25) 
Jw 
Jww r d2 y*_2 
+ Pl<'lP2^2''2712lJfî'''l* 
This equation implies that factor augmentations are determined by the expected cost 
share, f^(l + the marginal productivity of the technical progress function, 
the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, ^ the standard deviation of 
the forecast, <r^, and the contemporaneous correlation coefficient, 7j^2" 
In the deterministic case (cr^ = 0 and <T2 = 0) or in the case of a risk-neutral firm 
{Jww = 0), and assuming, without loss of generality, that PiX^ = ^2-^2 ~ 
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and that the equation will be. 
j - j ^ P i X ^ h W h - h ) -
By substituting this equation into (8.13) in the Appendix, we can derive the bias of 
technical change as 
Q. = ^^^[PiXthf(S2 - «1)1, 
where f2 denotes the Hicks definition of technical change bias and e represents the 
elasticity of substitution. This equation leads directly to the Hicksian proposition 
and corollary. 
Proposition 1 (Hicksian): Assuming no uncertainty or for a risk-neutral firm and 
assuming that the elasticity of substitution is greater than one, if the expected growth 
rate of the price of input 1, S^, is greater (less) than that of input 2, 82, then technical 
change will be biased toward input 2 (input 1))-^ 
Corollary 1: The Hicksian proposition can be completely identified in the determin­
istic case or for a risk-neutral firm. 
For a risk-averse firm, however, input price variability will also influence the bias 
of technical change. Assuming that P\X^ = ^2^2 ~ ^i^i that /ij* = h'^ — 
fej*, then (3.25) can be simplified to 
% - g = ^i^i^'i^h -h)~ ^I*^'i*(^2 ~ ^l)' (3-26) 
^®Sato and Ramachandran (1987) have also proved this Hicksian proposition. 
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If the firm is risk averse, Jww is negative and (3.26) implies that factor augmentations 
will depend on and <t|. 
Substituting (3.26) into (8.13) in the Appendix yields 
a = (l^[p.xfh'^{S2 - fi) - - c\)\. 
Note that, even if there is no difference in the expected growth rates of input prices, 
technical change will be biased so long as input prices are uncertain and cr| does not 
equal <7^. This equation also suggests that, if the elasticity of substitution is greater 
than one, endogenous technical change will be biased toward the input that has the 
more certain price. These results are summarized in the following proposition and 
corollary. 
Proposition 2: For a risk-averse firm, even if there is no difference in the expected 
growth rates of input prices, the rate of technical change will be biased because of 
the existence of uncertainty in input prices. Assuming that = 82 and e > I, if 
^2 ^ technical change will he biased toward input 1 (SI < 0). If < o'\, 
then technical change will be biased toward input 2 (T2 > 0^. 
Corollary 2: For a risk-averse firm facing different expected growth rates in input 
prices and input price uncertainty, the possibility of Hicks-neutral technical change 
(Y2 = 0^ may not be excluded because of the existence of input price uncertainty and 
risk. 
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3.4 Output Price Uncertainty 
Assume that, at the time of decision making, the two input prices are known but 
that the output price is uncertain and that the firm expects the input and output 
prices to be log-normally distributed as follows: 
dP^ = Piô-^dt^ 
dP2 = 
dP = PSpdt + PcTpdzp. 
Without the loss of generality, we can assume that research expenditures are 
chosen as expenditure levels rather than as a proportion of total revenue. Expected 
production income at the current moment may be expressed as 
77 = PY — P\X-^ — — E-^ — E^i 
where jBj and are the research expenditures on A and J5, respectively. In addition, 
the technical progress functions can be written as 
dA = Ahi{Ei)dt^ and (3.27) 
dB = Bh2{E2)dt. 
The change in production income and the change in the firm's wealth can be derived 
by Itô differentiation [see (8.2) in the Appendix] as 
dir = YdP - XidPi - X2dP2 
= [YP6p — XiPiSi — -^^2-^2^2]^^ + YPcTpdzp, and 
d W  =  [ 6 i ^ W  +  P Y i l  +  5 p ) - P i X i { l  +  6 i ) - P 2 X 2 i l  +  6 2 )  
—E"^ — E2]dt + PYcpdzp, 
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The stochastic Hamiltonian and first-order conditions for control variables can 
be written as [see (8.3) and (8.4) in the Appendix] 
H = Jw[SLW + P{1 + 6P)F{AXI, BX2)-PiXi{l+Si)-P2X2{l + S2) 
-El - E2] + + JBlBk2{E2)] + \jyjwP'^F'^^' 
dH 
~ — P-^[l 8-^)]J-uy)[p'^<T^FF-^A\ (3.28) 
f^TT 
= Jw[P{^ 8p)F2B — P2{1-{• S2)]-\-Jww[P'^<^'yFF2^\ (3.29) 
By combining the provided first-order conditions, input decision rules under out­
put price uncertainty can be depicted as 
In the deterministic case or for the case of a risk-neutral firm, the firm applies inputs 
to the point at which the marginal-value product equals input price. For a risk-averse 
firm, inputs will be utilized to the point at which the marginal-value product equals 
input price plus a marginal risk premium. Thus, a risk-averse firm will apply less 
inputs than will a risk-neutral firm. 
(3.30) 
dH 
= -Jw + JBBh2 = Q. (3.31) 
P{l + 8p )FiA = Pi{l + 6i)-^[P^a-lFFiA],B,nà 
Jw 
P ( l  +  S p ) F 2 B  =  P 2 ( l  +  S 2 ) - ^ l P ^ < r i F F 2 B ] .  
Jw 
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Combining first-order conditions (3.30) and (3.31) yields 
Jw = ~ J^^5^2(^2)" (3.32) 
El and E2 will be determined at the point at which the marginal utility of wealth 
equals the marginal utility of A or B, times the level of factor augmentation, times 
the marginal productivity of the technical progress function with respect to research 
expenditures. 
To derive a relationship between output price uncertainty and the bias of tech­
nical change, we differentiate (3.32) and find the change in marginal utility over time 
as [see (8.5) in the Appendix] 
= -[JwP{l + 5p)F^Xl+Jj^hl + JwwP^F*F^Xl<7l]dt (3.36) 
+JAn}PE*<^pdzp, and 
djQ = -[JwP{l+Sp)F^X^-\-jQh'^ + JwwP^F*F^X^aj]dt (3.37) 
Substituting (3.33), (3.36), and (3.37) into (3.34) and clarifying yields 
[JwP{l + 8p)FlXlAh'^ -f- + JwwP'^F*FlX{alAh'{]dt (3.38) 
= [JwP{l + Sp)F^X^Bh'<^ + Jwh'^ + JwwP^F*F^X^(TlBhi^]dL 
Combining (3.27) and (3.38) yields 
'Â~B ~ ~ ^2(^2^ = (3.39) 
Jwvj — JAw^^l ~ ^ B'w^^2'> 
Ah^dJA — Bh^'^J jg, 
dJuj = —Juq8j^dt JixjujPF*CTpdzp^ 
(3.34) 
(3.35) 
(3.33) 
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^^p'^F*F^X^crlBh'^ - f(l + 6p)FlXlAh'^ 
-^P'^F^'FlXlalAh'^. Jw ^ 
Substituting the first-order conditions (3.28) and (3.29) into (3.39) yields 
^2^2 -^2(1 + ^2) - Xih'i fi(l + ^i). 
Assuming that -Pi-X"!" = -^2-^2 ~ ^1* ~ ^2* ~ equation can be 
simplified as 
2~ j§~ - h)' 
Substituting this equation into (8.13) in the Appendix yields 
This equation indicates that output price uncertainty has no impact on the di­
rection of technical change bias. However, note that the optimal input use by a 
risk-averse firm is less than that of a risk-neutral firm. Moreover, the optimal input 
use decreases as —increases or as ap increases. These relationships lead directly 
to the following proposition and corollaries. 
Proposition 3: Assuming that the output price is uncertain and that e > 1, if the 
expected growth rate of the price of input 1, Si, is greater (less) than that of input 2, 
82, then the technical change will be biased toward input 2 (input 1). 
Corollary 3: The degree of technical change bias for a risk-averse firm is less than 
that for a risk-neutral firm or for the deterministic case. 
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Corollary 4: If the firms are risk averse, then the degree of technical change bias 
would decrease as the firm becomes more risk averse or as the riskiness increases. 
3.5 Input and Output Price Uncertainty 
In this section, we assume that the output price, P, and an input price, Pi, are 
unknown at the moment of decision making and that the firm expects all prices to 
be log-normally distributed.^^ The other input price, ^2» is assumed to be certain. 
dP = PSpdt 4- PcTpdzp, 
dPi = PiSidt + Picridzi, 
dP2 = 
Under these assumptions, expected production income can be defined as 
TT = PF{AJCi, BX2) — — P2X2 — E-^ — ^2" 
By differentiating stochastically, using (8.2) in the Appendix, and manipulating, the 
stochastic production income in the immediate future and the change in the firm's 
wealth can be written as 
irdt + d'K — (1 + 6p )F — P^XiiX + — ^2^2(^ ^2) ~ ^1 — E2\dt 
+[FFcrp ; — 
dzp 
dz^ 
^^It is possible to derive similar results in the situation in which all prices, P, Pj, 
and Pg, are uncertain. The model, however, will be more complex. 
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and 
d W  =  [ 8 i W ^ P { l - 8 p ) F - P i X i { l ^ 8 i ) - P 2 X 2 { l  +  6 2 )  (3.40) 
-E-^ — E^dt + \PF<T'p ; — 
dzr 
dz\ 
The firm's objective is to maximize the expected discounted utility of terminal 
state variables, (3.2), subject to the accounting identity, (3.40), and technical progress 
constraints, (3.27). The stochastic Hamiltonian and first-order conditions for X2, 
El, and E2 can be written as [see (8.3) and (8.4) in the Appendix.] 
H = Jw[SiW + P{l + 5p)F{AXi, BX2)-PiXi{l + 5i)-P2X2{l + 62) 
-El - E2] + Jj!i[Ahi{Ei)] + J£[Bh2{E2)] 
1 Ipl 
dH 
pF(Tp 
-PlXl<Tl 
2_2 
— JwiPi}-8'p)FiA — Pi{l 6i)\-\-JujiuiP (TpFFiA (3.41) 
-PP\(rilpiF(Tp - PiXi(7Tp')^iPapFiA + PIXI<T\] = 0, 
dH 
— Jw[P{^ 8'p)F2B — P2{^82)\-\-J'W'w[P'^(JpFF2B 
-PlXi<ri7ylP(TpF25] = 0, 
(3.42) 
dH 
dEi 
= —Jw + J^Ahi = 0, and (3.43) 
dH 
0^2 
= —Jw + JB^^2 ~ (3.44) 
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where 7^]^ denotes the contemporaneous correlation coefficient between two stochastic 
processes, P and Pi. 
In the deterministic case (<Tp = 0 and ai = 0) or for the case of a risk-neutral firm 
{Jww = 0), the firm applies inputs to the point at which the expected marginal-value 
product equals the respective expected input price. For a risk-averse firm {J-ww < 0), 
inputs will be utilized to the point at which the expected marginal-value product 
equals the expected input price plus a risk premium. If the contemporaneous corre­
lation coefficient between P and Pj is negative {"jpi < 0), then the risk premium is 
greater, causing the firm to apply less input. On the other hand, if 7^^ is positive, 
the risk premium is lower and Xi and X2 will be increased. 
Combining the first-order conditions (3.43) and (3.44) yields 
jEj and E2 will be determined at the point at which the marginal utility of wealth 
equals the marginal utility of ^ or J3 times the level of factor augmentation and 
marginal productivity of the technical progress function. 
To retrieve a relationship between uncertainty and the bias of technical change, 
we can differentiate (3.45) and find the change in marginal utility over time as [see 
(8.5) in the Appendix.] 
Jw = J~ JgBA2(^2)' (3.45) 
'^Aw^^'l = JBw^^2 
Ah^dJ= Bh2^J2^ 
Jw^jjdt -f Jn)w[PF*i (3.48) 
(3.47) 
(3.46) 
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dJA = -[JwP{l + Sp)F^Xf+JAhl+JwwP^4^*^î''^î 
— JwwP 
(3.49) 
dzj, 
(fzi 
, and 
g — ~\JwP{}- + Sp)F2X2 + JB^2 JwwP^<^pP*^2^2 
-JwvjPPiX^o'por-^'fp-^^F^X^ldt 
(3.50) 
dzp 
dzi 
Substituting (3.46), (3.49), and (3.50) into (3.47) and clarifying yield 
[JyjP{l + 8p)F^XlAh'{ + Jy,hl + J^y}P'^(TlF*F{XlAh'{ (3.51) 
-JwwPPiXlarp(Ti'y^lFlXlAh'{]dt = [JwP{l + 8p)F^X^Bh'^ + Jwh^ 
-{-JwwP^'^pF* F^X^Bh'^ — JwwP J* 
Combining (3.51) and (3.27) yields 
B A 
A 
J* 
B = hiiEl) - &2(4) = -[f(l + Sp)FjXlAh'{ (3.52) 
+ ^ P^<r^F*F^XfAh'{ -  ^PPiXf<Tp(Ti^ iF^XlAh'{] 
Jiu Jill " 
Jn 
+[P(1 + Sp)F^X^Bh'<^ + '!^P^a-jF*F^X^Bh'<^ 
"W 
'W 
Substituting the first-order conditions (3.41) and (3.42) into (3.52) yields 
- g = '^2^2"l'P2(l + ^ 2)l - +fi)| 
By assuming that PiX^ = •^2-^2 ~ that h'-^ = = A,*, we can further 
simplify the equation to 
I -1 = - pixi4)]. 
Substituting this equation into (8.13) in the Appendix yields 
n  = - h ) -  -  P i X t < r U  
In the deterministic case (a-p = 0 and = 0) or in the case of the risk-neutral 
firm {Jww — 0), the Hicksian proposition may be derived. For a risk-averse firm 
{Jww < 0), even if there is no difference in the growth rates of input prices, the 
technical change will be biased if the output price and an input price are assumed 
to be uncertain. If the correlation coefficient between the two processes of P and 
is zero (7^^ = 0), we can derive proposition 2. If 7^5^ is less than zero and e > 1, 
then technical change will be biased toward However, if 7^^ is greater than zero, 
the direction of technical change will not be determined. That is, assuming that the 
elasticity of substitution is greater than one, if two processes of P-^ and P are highly 
and positively correlated, the technical change may be biased toward Xi, and if they 
are insignificantly and positively or negatively correlated, the technical change may 
be biased toward %2' 
Proposition 4: For a risk-averse firm, if the output price and an input price are 
assumed to be uncertain, even if there is no difference in the growth rates of input 
prices, the rate of bias of endogenous technical progress will he different. Assuming 
p ^ 
that = 62 and that e > 1, if'fpi < , the technical change will be biased 
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toward input 2 (Cl > 0). If J pi > ^ technical change will be biased 
toward input 1 (ù <1). 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
The theory of endogenous technical progress assumes that a change in the relative 
price of inputs will lead to the invention of factor-saving technologies. Such inventions 
may be undertaken by a public institution or by an individual firm. In this chapter, 
an Itô control model has been developed to investigate the effects of uncertainty on 
the bias of technical change. In addition, uncertainty has been modeled as a set 
of Wiener processes in which the level of variance and covariance of these processes 
implies the level of uncertainty. 
We show that uncertainty in input prices will influence the rate of bias of technical 
progress. It is shown that the Hicksian proposition can be justified in both the 
deterministic case and in the case of a risk-neutral firm. For a risk-averse firm, the 
rate of bias of technical progress under input price uncertainty will not conform to the 
Hicksian proposition. By assuming that there is no difference in the growth rates of 
input prices, we conclude that endogenous technical change will be biased toward the 
input that has the more certain price if the elasticity of substitution is greater than 
one. This conclusion implies that, under uncertainty, even if the growth rates are 
different among input prices, the possibility of Hicks-neutral technical change exists. 
Under output price uncertainty, the direction of technical change bias is not 
affected by uncertainty but the degree increases as the firm becomes more risk averse 
or as riskiness increases. If uncertainty exists in an input price and in the output 
price, the contemporaneous correlation coefficient between these two processes will 
play an important role in the rate of technical change bias. If two processes, P and 
Pi, are significantly and positively correlated and the elasticity of substitution is 
greater than one, then technical change may be biased toward the input that has an 
uncertain price. On the other hand, if P and P^ are insignificantly and positively or 
negatively correlated, technical change may be biased against the input that has an 
uncertain price. 
The most important result in this chapter concerns the influence of input price 
uncertainty on the bias of technical change. We show that a firm will conduct research 
to increase the productivity of the inputs whose prices are less variable. This testable 
proposition is intuitive and has some important implications for economic policy. 
Governments can and often do influence the prices of inputs. This influence 
occurs via market intervention or through the legislative process. Examples of the 
former method include government stabilization of interest rates, currency, wages, 
and other input prices (i.e., feed grains). Examples of the latter method include laws 
designed to influence labor contracting, interest rates, and imports. To the extent 
that our assumptions are valid, the model shows that all these policies will influence 
technical progress. Governments that wish to maximize labor productivity may find 
that the relaxation of interest rates and currency stabilization policies work in their 
favor. Governments that wish to increase the productivity of land or capital may 
find it in their long-term interests to stabilize prices in the land rental and capital 
markets, respectively. 
This chapter presents no results about the magnitude of the possibly offsetting 
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effects of changes in relative prices of inputs versus changes in the variability of these 
prices. It may well be true that relative prices completely dominate the investment 
process. It would be unwise to base policy decisions on the results presented here 
until the relative magnitude of these two effects can be estimated. 
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4. THE FACTOR BIAS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE UNDER 
PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 has generalized the theory of the bias of technical change to incorporate 
price uncertainty and risk aversion. Considerable attention should be placed on the 
effects of price uncertainty. Production uncertainty, however, may have a relatively 
greater impact than that of market uncertainty for many sectors of an economy, 
particularly those involving biological growth (Pope and Kramer, 1979, p. 489). 
In practice, a number of instruments have been developed to reduce risk from price 
uncertainty (for example, hedging and forward contracting), but few instruments exist 
that reduce risk from production uncertainty (e.g., crop insurance is not widespread 
in the agricultural sector). Further, production uncertainty has been used as an 
important analytical tool for explaining techniques of production and adoption of 
technologies in development economics.^ 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how the incorporation of production 
uncertainty alters the Hicksian proposition presented in Chapter 2. The inputs that 
increase the variance of output are separated from those that reduce the variance of 
^See Feder (1980), Hiebert (1974), Just and Zilberman (1983), and Stoneman 
(1981) for detailed discussions on technology adoption. 
46 
output. The results show that, under production uncertainty, firms will deviate from 
the Hicksian proposition to economize on the use of inputs that increase the variability 
of production. This divergence will depend on the level of production uncertainty and 
on the degree of risk aversion of the decision maker; that is, the degree of technical 
change would be increased as the riskiness increases or as the firm becomes more risk 
averse. 
The model depends heavily on the specified assumptions; consequently, the re­
sults may not have immediate use in policy analysis. Nevertheless, the results are 
important in that they might help to explain some of the deviations from the Hicksian 
proposition that have been found in the empirical studies.^ Should it be possible to 
validate the theoretical results that follow, the concepts should help governments or 
researchers develop innovations with a greater likelihood of acceptance in a target 
audience. 
This chapter employs the stochastic control model developed in Chapter 3. The 
model allows us to derive some preparations regarding the impact of production 
uncertainty on factor-augmenting technical change, presented in the next section. The 
results are presented in terms of the implied deviations from the induced innovation 
theory. The final section contains concluding remarks and some tentative implications 
for policy. 
^See, for example, Antle (1984, 1986), Berndt and Khaled (1979), Binswanger 
(1974a, 1978), H ay ami and Ruttan (1985), Sato (1970), Stevenson (1980), and Weaver 
(1983). 
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4.2 The Model 
The stochastic microeconomic model described in Chapter 3 will be modified 
according to assumptions on production uncertainty. In this chapter, we assume 
that the firm can observe the uncertain production prospects at the time of decision 
making and that the firm expects the production level, V, and input prices, Pj and 
fg, to be log-normally distributed as 
dY — Ya-ydzy, 
dPi = P^Sidt, and 
dp2 = 
where a-y is the standard deviation of the percentage change in production, 6^ is the 
forecast for the growth rate of the price of input, and zy is a Wiener process in 
which E[dzy{t)] — 0 and E[dzy{t)]^ = dt. 
The definition that is derived from arguments of the standard deviation function^ 
is used in this chapter. If the first derivative of standard deviation of the percentage 
change in production with respect to input i is positive [oryx^ > 0), then is risk-
increasing input. On the other hand, if the derivative is negative {(Tyx^ < 0), then 
is risk-reducing input. For example, fertilizer or yield-increasing varieties might 
be termed risk increasing and irrigation or disease-resistant varieties might be termed 
risk reducing. 
The firm chooses to apply two inputs, Xi and X2, and two levels of research 
^The static uncertainty literature contains some other definitions of risk-reducing 
and risk-increasing inputs (Hertzler, 1987). See Pope and Kramer (1979) or Just and 
Pope (1979) for a detailed discussion. 
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expenditure, and £?2> the time of decision making; Expected production income 
at the current time may be expressed as 
TT = PY — — ^2'  
By using Itô's lemma [see (8.2) in the Appendix], we can stochastically differentiate 
for the change in production income to get 
dT7 = PdY -  XidPi -  X2dP2 
= PYcydzy — X\P-^6idt — X2P2^2^^'  
The stochastic production income in the immediate future, irdt + dir,  can be 
obtained as 
irdt dir = [PY — — P2-^2(^ + <^2) 
—E-^ — E2]dt + PYcydzy. 
By using (3.6), the change in the firm's wealth that is consistent with the accounting 
identity can be expressed as 
dW = [SiW+ PY -  PiXi{l + 8i)-P2X2{1 + S2) (4.1) 
— Ej^ — E2]dt + PY (TydZy, 
The model specifies that the objective of the firm is to maximize the expected 
discounted utility of terminal stock of state variables (3.2) subject to the accounting 
identity (4.1) and the technical progress constraints (3.27). X2, and E2 
are the control and choice variables, whereas W, A, and B are the stock and state 
variables respectively. 
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The Itô version of the Belhnan equation associated with this model specification 
can be derivçd as follows. 
— J l  = Max PF ~ •(" ^l) ~ ^ 2^2^^ 4- ^2) 
~ E i  -  E 2 }  + J ^ { A h i { E i ) }  +  j Q { B h 2 { E 2 ) }  + ^ 
By using (8.3) in the Appendix, the stochastic Hamilton!an can be written as 
H = Jw[SiW + PF{AXi, BX2) -  PiXiil  + 61)-  ^ 2^2(1 + ^ 2) 
-El - E2] + JA[AhiiEi)] + JB[Bh2{E2)] + \jwwP'^F'^a^. 
First-order conditions for Xj, Xg, Ei, and E2 may be obtained as [see (8.4) in the 
Appendix] 
A TT 
— = Jw[PFiA-Piil+Si)] + Jww[P^4^^l^ (4.2) 
-{•P'^ F"^ (TyCryx^] = 0, 
^ = MPF2B - P2il+62)] + JwmlP'^^^F^B (4.3) 
-{•p'^F'^<TyCryx2] — 0, 
du 
=  - J w  + = 0, and (4.4) 
= -Jw + Jb ^ ^ 2 - ^ '  (4.5) 
From the first-order conditions in (4.2) and (4.3), input decision rules under 
production uncertainty can be depicted as 
P F i A  =  P i { l  +  S i ) - ^ [ P ^ a ^ F F i A + P ^ F ^ < r y < T y x ^ ] , B ,nd 
P F 2 B  =  P 2 [ l ^ 8 2 ) - ^ - ^ [ P ' ^ < T l F F 2 B ^ P ' ^ F ' ^ < T y C T y x 2 l  
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These relationships have an intuitive interpretation. In the deterministic case with no 
uncertainty, ay = 0, the firm applies inputs to the point at which the marginal-value 
product equals the expected input price. For a risk-neutral firm, where J is a linear 
function of wealth {Jww = 0), we get the same result as in the deterministic case. For 
inputs will be utilized to the point at which their marginal-value product equals input 
price plus a marginal risk premium. If an input is risk reducing, the marginal risk 
premium will decrease. On the other hand, if an input is risk increasing, the marginal 
risk premium will increase. Therefore, if is risk reducing {cyxj^ < 0), a risk-averse 
firm will apply more X^s than will a risk-neutral firm. On the contrary, if X^ is risk 
increasing (cryx^ > 0), a risk-averse firm will apply less X^s than will a risk-neutral 
firm. 
Combining first-order conditions (4.4) and (4,5) yields 
This equation implies that Ei and E2 will be determined at the point at which the 
marginal utility of wealth equals the marginal utility of A or times the stock level 
of factor augmentation, times the first derivative of the technical progress function. 
To retrieve the relationship between production uncertainty and the bias of tech­
nical change, we must differentiate (4.6) partially with respect to W, A, and B and 
also differentiate (4.6) by using Itô's lemma to get 
a risk-averse firm, where -W'W. is negative and the marginal risk premium is positive 
(4.6) 
J A w ^ ^ I  =  J B W ^ ^ 2 ^  and 
Ah^^dJ= Bh2^J^. 
WW 
(4.8) 
(4.7) 
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The change in marginal utility over time may be expressed as [see (8.5) in the Ap­
pendix] 
dJu) — —Jy)S J^ dt + JuqudP F* (Tydzy, (4.9) 
dJji = -[JwPFlXf+J^hl + JyjwP^F*FfXl(T^]dt (4.10) 
+JAii}PF*<''yd'Zy, and 
dJ^ -^2 JvowP^F*F^X2(^'y\dt (4.11) 
By substituting (4.6), (4.7), (4.10), and (4.11) into (4.8) and simplifying, we may 
obtain 
[J-wPFlXlAh'{ + Jwhl + JwwP'^F*FlXlc-lAh'^]dt (4.12) 
= [Ju}PF^X^Bh'{ + ^2^2 + JwwP'^F*F^Xl<TlBh'{]dt. 
Combining (3.27) and (4.12) yields 
—= hi{El) - h2{E2) (4.13) 
= PF^X^Bh'^ + ^j^p'^F*F^X^(TlBh'{ 
-PF{XlAh'{^ - ^^P'^F^FiXltrlAh'i. 
This set of equations comprises the model. In the next section, these conditions will 
be combined with the propositions discussed earlier. 
4.3 The Results 
First, substituting (4.2) and (4.3) into (4.13) derives an explicit equation that 
explains the relationship between production uncertainty and the factor bias of tech­
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nical change. 
2 - g  =  X 2 ' ^ 2 l J ' 2 ( ^  +  h ) - ( 4 . 1 4 )  
- X i h { * l P l ( l  +  i l )  -  ^p 2 F \ < r y x i ] .  
Equation (4.14) summarizes the important results of this chapter. This equation 
states that the difference in the optimum rate of factor augmentation will 
depend on the difference between the net benefit of research devoted to reducing 
reliance on input 1 and the net benefit of research devoted to reducing reliance on 
input 2. The term will be negative for the individual's concave utility functions. 
The terms Fi(l + S{) represents the expected costs of input i caused by an expected 
increase in its price. The term — F^a-yCyx^ will be positive for as long as 
the input increases the variability of output; i.e., risk increasing. Notice that if 
the input is risk reducing, this second term may offset the expected growth in input 
price. 
To further simplify, assume, without loss of generality, that both inputs have 
similar costs, PiX^ = i'2^2 ~ '> that optimum factor-augmenting research 
expenditures have similar returns for both inputs; i.e., • This result 
simplifies (4.14) to 
^ = PiXfh'*[{82 - Si) - -~P^F'^<Ty{(7yx2 - ^yxi)]- (4.15) 
Substituting (4.15) into (8.13) in the Appendix yields 
9, = -—-—^-PiXf h'*[{82 - 5i) —^j^P^F^<Ty{<Tyx2 - <^yxi )]• 
If there is no uncertainty, (ry will equal zero and and 62 will be the known input 
prices. This result leads directly to Proposition 1 (Hicksian): When there is no 
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uncertainty or when firms are risk neutral, relative input prices will determine the 
bias of technical change. 
In situations in which firms are risk averse and where the production process is 
uncertain, the bias of technical change will be different from that predicted by Hicks. 
The magnitude of this difference will depend on the difference between 6^ and 62 and 
on cryxY and cryx2 and . 
If is risk increasing and X2 is risk reducing, then technical change will be 
biased toward X2 in a manner that is independent of relative input prices if the 
elasticity of substitution is greater than one. This result can best be seen by assuming 
that Si = 6^2 ; i e., the expected growth rates of input prices are similar. If this 
assumption is the case, (4.15) can be written as 
n = )]. (4.16) 
This equation leads directly to the following proposition. 
Proposition 5: For a risk-averse firm facing production uncertainty, the rate of 
endogenous factor-augmenting technical change will he biased even for the case in 
which there is no difference in the expected growth rates of input prices. If e > 1 and 
<^yx2 > ^yxi, then the technical change will be biased toward input 1 < 0). If 
( T y x 2  <  ,  t h e n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  c h a n g e  w i l l  h e  b i a s e d  t o w a r d  i n p u t  2  ( C l > ^ ) .  
One interesting, though unlikely, possibility is that the effect of uncertainty might 
offset the changes in relative input prices, which happen if P''^'^y<^yxi) 
is equal to (<^2 ~ cry(7^x2)» This result implies that ^ can be equal to 
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even if the firm faces different expected growth rates in input prices. This implication 
leads to the following corollary. 
Corollary 5: For a risk-averse firm facing different expected growth rates in in­
put prices and production uncertainty, the Hicks-neutral technical change can not he 
excluded (Q,-=Q) because of the existence of production uncertainty and risk. 
We might investigate the impacts of increasing risk on the degree of bias of tech­
nical change by using (4.15) or (4.16). For a risk-averse firm, the term (0) is positively 
related to ay if (Tyx2 is greater than <Tyx^. And it is negatively related to cy if cryx2 
is less than (7yxi • Define ay as increasing risk.'^ The degree of technical change bias 
toward Xj increases as ay increases if is greater than cryxi- And the degree 
toward %2 will increase as ay increases if o'yx2 is less than fyxj. This relationship 
is summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 6: The degree of technical change bias would increase as riskiness in­
creases. 
A similar relationship between the degree of technical change bias and the degree 
of a firm's risk aversion can be derived by using (4.15). fî will increase as — 
increases if cryx2 is greater than This result implies that the degree of factor 
^Increasing risk can be defined as a mean-preserving spread of the distribution, 
following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971). Here, it is simply defined as a standard 
deviation function,  ay.  
bias toward Xi increases as the firm becomes more risk averse. If aryx2 i® less than 
ft/a;2, the degree of factor bias toward X2 increases as the firm becomes more risk 
averse. This result leads to Proposition 7. 
Proposition 7: The degree of technical change bias would increase as the firm became 
more risk averse. 
This proposition is intuitively appealing. We expect the risk-averse firm to be 
willing to pay more for research expenditures to reduce the use of risk-increasing 
inputs and to develop and adopt the technologies that use risk-reducing inputs. And 
the more research expenditure that the firm is willing to pay, the more risk averse 
the firm is. 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter investigates how production uncertainty affects the bias of technical 
change. The similar model used in Chapter 3 incorporates production uncertainty. 
Inputs are characterized from arguments of the standard deviation function. The 
results show that, under production uncertainty, technical progress for the risk-averse 
firm will be affected by the characteristics of inputs (i.e., risk increasing or risk re­
ducing). Technical change will be biased toward risk-reducing inputs and against 
risk-increasing inputs if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one. It is shown 
that the degree of bias of technical change would be increased as the riskiness in­
creases or as the firm becomes more risk averse. It is also shown that the Hicksian 
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proposition is a special case in which there is no uncertainty or in which firms are 
risk neutral. 
Prom a policy perspective, the principal conclusion that can be drawn from this 
chapter is that the degree of output uncertainty will influence the types of technology 
that are developed and adopted. For example, new hybrid varieties of corn might 
be more favorably received in parts of the United States where weather conditions 
are more stable, whereas risk-reducing innovations would be more useful in areas 
where weather patterns are more volatile. Internationally, one would expect the risk-
increasing technologies of the Green Revolution to be successfully adopted in countries 
or regions with stable output patterns. Also, the results suggest that research should 
concentrate on technologies that reduce risk in regions where production uncertainty 
is high. 
Finally, the overall conclusion of Chapters 3 and 4 is that uncertainty is an im­
portant factor in determining the bias of technical change. These chapters, however, 
do not assume the existence of instruments that reduce uncertainty and risk. Hedging 
and forward contracting reduce risk from output price uncertainty. Crop insurance 
deals with production uncertainty. Therefore, one obvious extension of the model is 
to introduce these instruments. 
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5. HEDGING AND THE BIAS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 
5.1 Introduction 
Previous models have explored the effects of uncertainty on the bias of technical 
change. These models all assume that there is no management of risk or uncertainty. 
In practice, however, futures markets exist for many agricultural products and some 
metals (Holthausen, 1979). That is, firms may also use hedging or forward contracts 
that are designed to reduce risk from uncertainty. On the other hand, the theory 
of the competitive firm under uncertainty and considering futures markets has been 
developed extensively in the literature.^ 
This chapter attempts to integrate these two approaches. The model used in 
Chapter 3 is extended to incorporate forward markets in the theory of the bias of 
technical change under price uncertainty. The results show that, when only the 
output price is uncertain, the existence of a forward market has no effect on the 
direction of technical change bias but has an effect on the degree of bias. In Chapter 
3, we showed that, assuming input and output price uncertainty, the sign and size 
^See, for example, Anderson and Danthine (1981,1983a, 1983b), Danthine (1978), 
Feder, Just, and Schmitz (1980), Gilbert (1985), Holthausen (1979), Karp (1987, 
1988), Marcus and Modest (1984), and McKinnon (1967). 
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of the correlation coefficient between output price and input price would play an 
important role in the bias of technical change. However, if the firm can use forward 
contracts, this correlation coefficient does not affect the direction of technical change 
bias. That is, if the forward market is unbiased and the elasticity is greater than one, 
the technical change will be biased toward the input that has a certain price. 
In the next section, only output price uncertainty and forward markets are con­
sidered. Input price uncertainty is added in the following section. Concluding remarks 
are presented in the final section of this chapter. 
5.2 Hedging and Output Price Uncertainty 
The representative firm is assumed to face a random output price and to expect 
all prices to be log-normally distributed. Output can either be sold in the future at 
the random price P or sold forward at the certain price 6. Thus, we must add the 
process of certain price, which is shown below, to the model specification of output 
price uncertainty in Chapter 3. 
d b  =  S f j d t ,  
where denotes the forecast for the growth rate of the certain price. 
Under the specified assumptions, expected income from production at the current 
time can be written as 
TT = P ^ F  —  (?) — P'^X'^ — ^2'^2 — -^1 — -^2' 
where G represents the amount of output hedged in the forward market. If we stochas­
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tically differentiate this equation by using (8.2) in the Appendix, 
di? = {F-G)dP-XidPi-X2dP2 + Gdb (5.1) 
=  [ ( F  -  G ) P 6 p  -  X i P i S i  -  X 2 P 2 S 2  +  G b S i , ] d t  +  { F -  G ) P ( T p d z p .  
By using equations (3.6) and (5.1) and manipulating, the accounting identity, which 
is the change in the firm's wealth, can be obtained as 
d W  = [ 6 i W  +  { F - G ) P { l  +  S p ) - P i X i { l  +  S i ) - P 2 X 2 { l  +  S 2 )  (5.2) 
+Cr6(l + Sjj) — E-^ — E2]dt + {F — G)Po'pdzp, 
Note that the amount of output hedged in the forward market is the control 
and choice variable. With the objective function, (3.2), and constraints, (3.27) and 
(5.2), the stochastic Hamiltonian and first-order conditions for control variables can 
be written as [see (8.3) and (8.4) in the Appendix] 
H = Jw[SiW+{F-G)P{l + Sp)-PiXi{l + 6i)-P2X2{l + S2) (5.3) 
+Gb{l + Sjj) - El - E2] + J^[Ahi{Ei)\ 
- [ • J B [ B h 2 { E 2 ) ]  +  - J w w { F  -  G } ^ P ' ^ c r p ,  
= J w \ P { ^  ^  ^ p ) F i A  —  P i ( \  J i i } w [ { F  —  G ) P ( y p F i A \  =  Q ,  { b A )  
QX2 ~ — -P2(^ ^2)] = 0, (5.5) 
Q J£  
=  - J w  + =  0. (5.6) 
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(5.7) 
"âp — «Ayl—^{1 + <^p) + + *^ô)] + «Awwf—— G')P^(rp] = G. (5.8) 
This equation indicates that, if the firm is assumed to be risk neutral {Jww = 0), 
the term Jyj[—P{\ + 6p) + 6(1 + 5j)] is independent of G. This result implies that 
no solution exists if the forward market is biased, f(l + 6p) ^ 6(1 + f^), and G is 
indeterminate if the forward market is unbiased, P(1 + fy) = 6(1 + 5^). That is, the 
forward market will not operate if Arms are risk neutral. For a risk-averse firm, if the 
f o r w a r d  m a r k e t  i s  u n b i a s e d ,  t h e  f i r m  w i l l  h e d g e  i t s  e n t i r e  o u t p u t ,  G  =  F .  l i  P { \  +  8 p )  
is less than 6(1 + f^), the firm might speculate by selling forward an amount that is 
greater than its output, G > F. li P{1 + êp) is greater than 6(1 + (5^), the firm will 
hedge an amount that is less than its output, G < F. 
Substituting (5.8) into (5.4) and (5.5) gives 
These equations explain input decision rules under output price uncertainty and con­
sidering the forward contracts. That is, the firm will apply inputs to the point at 
which their marginal-value products equal input prices. Therefore, all risk-averse 
Rewriting (5.8) yields 
6(1 + «(,) = + «p) - ^ (G -
Jw 
h { l - [ •  8 i ^ ) F i A  = P]^(l + <5^), and 
h { l  +  8 i ) F 2 B  = P2(1 + ^ 2)-
(5.9) 
(5.10) 
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firms in the market will key their input decisions to the forward price and input 
prices. 
Combining first-order conditions (5.6) and (5.7) yields 
J w  =  J =  J ^ B h 2 { ^ 2 ) '  (5.11) 
This equation implies that the control variables, E-^ and E2, will be applied to the 
point at which the marginal utility of wealth equals the marginal utility of A and 
B times the level of factor augmentation and marginal productivity of the technical 
progress function. 
To derive the relationship between hedging and the bias of technical change, we 
should differentiate (5.11) partially with respect to W, A, and B and also differentiate 
(5.11) totally to get 
J w w  =  J ~ (5.12) 
Ah^^dJ^ = Bh2^JQ. (5.13) 
The change in marginal utility over time, which are also first-order conditions, can 
be obtained as [see (8.5) in the Appendix] 
dJyj = —JyjSj^dt -j- ~ G^^PCpdzp^ (5.14) 
dJ*^A^1 (5.15) 
+Jww{F* -  -  G*)P(Tpdzp, and 
dJQ = —[€7U;P(1 "l" ^p)i^2-^2 *^5^2 (5.16) 
+Jww{F* -  + JBwi^* -  G*)P<Tpdzp. 
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Substituting (5.11), (5.12), (5.15), and (5.16) into (5.13) and simplifying yields 
Jw{l + 6p)FlXlAh'{ + Jyjh\ + Jww{F* - G*)P'^alFlXlAh!^ (5.17) 
= Jw{l + 8y)F^X:^Bh!^ + Jwhl + Jwxv{F* -
Combining (3.27) and (5.17) yields 
—= hi{El)-h2{E2) = P{l + 6j,)F2X2Bh2 (5.18) 
+^(i^* - -(14- 8p)F{XlAh'{; 
-^(F* - G*)p'^<TlF(XlAh'^. Jw f  i  J. 
Substituting the first-order condition, (5.4) and (5.5) into (5.18) yields 
^ = X 2 h 2 P 2 { ' i -  +  <^2) - ^1^1*(1 + <^l)-
By assuming PiX^ — P2^2 ~ — ^2* ~ M'*' equation can be 
simplified to 
2~ B ~ -  <'' l ) -
By substituting this equation into (8.13) in the Appendix, we may obtain 
This equation indicates that the direction of technical change bias is not aff'ected by 
the existence of forward markets. However, note that the input decision is based on 
the forward price and not on the concept that the firm expects to prevail and that 
the degree of risk aversion will have no effect on the production decision. These rela­
tionships lead to following proposition. 
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Proposition 8: Assuming output price uncertainty, the existence of hedging or for­
ward markets has no impact on the direction of technical change bias. 
By comparing the first-order conditions of output price uncertainty in Chapter 
3 with (5.9) and (5.10), it is clear that if P(1 4- Sp) equals or is less than b{l + 5^), 
and optimal input use under the assumption of the existence of a forward market is 
greater than that of nonexistence. This leads directly to following corollary. 
Corollary 6: Under output price uncertainty, if P{1 + 6p) equals or is less than 
6(1 + the existence of hedging would increase the degree of technical change bias. 
5.3 Hedging and Input and Output Price Uncertainty 
In Chapter 3, we showed that, assuming output price uncertainty and one input 
price uncertainty, the contemporaneous correlation coefficient between output price 
and input price would play an important role in the bias of technical change. In this 
section, we investigate the influence of hedging or forward contracts on the results 
that are derived in Chapter 3. 
Expected production income will be the same as that in the previous section. 
By differentiating stochastically, using (8.2) in the Appendix, and manipulating, the 
stochastic production income in the immediate future and the change in the firm's 
wealth can be obtained as 
irdt + d-K =  [ P { l  +  5 p ) { F - G )  + b{l + 6 f , ) G  
+ <^l) ~ -^2^2(1 + <^2) — E-^  — E 2 ] d t  
(5.19) 
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+[ {F-G)P<r j ,  ;  -X iP i<T i \  
d z p  
d z i  
and 
dW = [S^W + P{l + 6p ) { F - G ) - ^ b { l  +  6 j j ) G  
+ ^l) — P2^2(^ + ^ 2) —  E l  —  E 2 ] d t  
d z r  
(5.20) 
+[ {F  — G)P(Tp  ;  -X iP i f f i ]  
d z i  
The stochastic Hamiltonian and first-order conditions for the control variables 
^1» ^2) be written as [see (8.3) and (8.4) in the Appendix] 
H = Jw[SiW + f(l + 8 p ) { F  - G )  +  h { l  +  Sj j )G  
+  S i )  -  P 2 ^ 2 ( ^  +  ^ 2 )  —  -  E 2 ]  
-\-Jj^[Ahi{Ei)] + jQ[Bh2{E2)\ 
- ^ n J w w i i P  —  G ) P ( T p  \  — X i P i c r i ]  
. '''pl ^ 
dH 
[F  — G)Po 'p  
,2_2: 
^ —  J w [ P i i S p ) F i A  —  P i { l  • + S i ) ]  +  J w w i i F  —  G ) P  c r p F i A  (5.21) 
-PlXiai'yplPcrpFiA -{F - G)Piai'jpiPcrp + XiP^cri = 0, 
— Jw[P{^ + Sp)F2B — P2{1 + S2)] + JwwiiF — G)P'^apF2B (5.22) 
-PlXicri'ypiP<rpF2B] = 0, 
dH 
d E i  
65 
— ~Jw 4" J= 0, (5.23) 
dH 
= -/ly + Jj5J9/i2 = Oi and (5.24) 
Q JT 
-QQ = 4- 6(,) — f (1 + 6^p)) + (F — G)f ^ (Tp (5.25) 
+PlXi(7i'yjjiP(Tp] = 0. 
If we assume that the forward market is unbiased, f (1+6^) = f (l+fp), equation 
(5.25) yields 
(F - G)Pcrp = PiXiai'-ipi. (5.26) 
Equation (5.26) implies that, if the forward market is unbiased and the contempora­
neous correlation coefficient is zero, the risk-averse firm will hedge its entire output. 
If is greater than zero and 6(1 4- f^) = f (1 + fp), the risk-averse firm will hedge 
less than its output (G < F). If 7^]^ is less than zero and 6(1 -f- (5j) = P(1 + 6p), the 
risk-averse firm might speculate by selling forward an amount greater than its output 
{ G > F ) .  
Substituting (5.25) into (5.21) and (5.22) yields 
b(l + Si)FiA = P^{1 + S^) - ^ [-(F - G)Pi<rnj,iP^p (5.27) 
-j-XjPj cTj], and 
+ = •^2(^+^2)- (5.28) 
These equations indicate that, for a risk-averse Arm, the optimum input level is deter­
mined by the forward price, input prices, and marginal risk premium. An important 
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result is that risk-averse firms will key their input decisions not to the random price 
but to the forward price. 
By combining first-order conditions, (5.23) and (5.24), and differentiating the 
combined equation, we can obtain the same equations with (5.11), (5.12), and (5.13). 
To derive the explicit relationship, the change in marginal utility over time can be 
written as [see (8.5) in the Appendix] 
dJu) — —Jn)Sj^dt -}- Jww[{P* ~ G*)Pcj'p ; 
dJA = -[JwP[l'rSp)FlXl + JAh\ 
d z j ,  
d z ^  
(5.29) 
(5.30) 
+ J w w { F *  -  G * ) P ^ ( 7 j F ^ X l  -  P i X l ( T i ^ p i P < 7 p F ^ X f ] d t  
- G*)fcrp ; - X i P i c r i ]  
dz^ 
dz-i 
, and 
dJQ — —[<7ujP(l "t" 6p)F2 X2 4" J5^2 
+ J w w { F *  -  G * ) P ^ ( r j F ^ X ^  -  P i X l ^ i f p i P a p F ^ X ^ l d t  
(5.31) 
+ J B w [ i F *  -  G ' ' ) P a p  ; -XiPia^] 
dzi 
d z i  
Substituting (5.11), (5.12), (5.30), and (5.31) into (5.13) and and combining equation 
(3.27) yields 
B (5.32) 
* V* A %./*! 
-{•^P^crliF* - G*)F^XfAh'{ - :I:f^PP^Xl<rpai-/ iF^X^Ah'^] 
J w  J u )  
+[f(l + Sp)F^X^Bh'^ + - G*)F^X^Bhl,^ 
^PPlXiVp^l7pif2'^2®''2'l * V* DL/*! 
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By substituting (5.25), (5.26), (5.27), and (5.28) into (5.32), and by assuming 
that PiX^ = •^2-^2 ~ h'!j^ = h2 = h*, the equation can be simplified to 
^ - I = PiXlhtl{62 - «1) - :^p2XiV?(72i - 1)], 
Note that the above equation is derived by assuming unbiased forward market, f (1 + 
6p) = 6(1 + Sfy). We can derive the technical change bias by substituting the above 
equation into (8.13) in the Appendix. 
a = - Sj) - _ 1)1, 
Because 7^]^ is less than 1, f2 is always positive. This equation indicates that the tech­
nical change will be biased toward input 2 if the elasticity of substitution is greater 
than one and if there is no difference in the expected growth rates of input prices. 
This result leads directly to the following proposition. 
Proposition 9; Assuming that 61 = ^2 ® risk-averse firm facing an unbiased 
forward market, if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one, then technical 
p r o g r e s s  w i l l  b e  b i a s e d  t o w a r d  i n p u t  2 ,  w h i c h  h a s  a  c e r t a i n  p r i c e  f Q  >  O j .  
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, the model is extended to incorporate forward markets in the 
theory of the technical change bias under uncertainty. The results show that, under 
output price uncertainty, the direction of technical change is not affected by the 
existence of forward markets. However, if the forward markets are unbiased, the 
degree of technical change would increase as the forward markets are activated. It is 
also shown that, if uncertainty exists in both the output price and input price and 
the forward market is unbiased, technical progress will more likely be biased toward 
the input that has a certain price. 
By comparing these results with those in Chapter 3, we might obtain some 
important policy implications. The conclusion can be drawn from Chapter 3 that 
price stabilization programs would increase the rate and degree of technical change 
bias. This chapter, however, implies that activation of forward markets may be an 
alternative way to influence technical progress. If uncertainty exists in both the output 
price and input price and the correlation coefficient is negative or insignificantly 
positive, the activation of forward markets has no effect on the direction of technical 
change bias. On the other hand, in Chapter 3, we show that, if output price is 
significantly and positively correlated with input price, the technical change will be 
biased toward the input that has an uncertain price. The activation of forward 
markets, however, might alter the direction of technical change bias. That is, technical 
change will be biased toward the input that has a certain price. 
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6. TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
6.1 Introduction 
There is a large body of literature on the effects of government price stabiliza­
tion programs on producer and consumer welfare and on economic indicators.^ On 
the other hand, technology adoption models have been analyzed to determine the 
adoption behavior and to derive the diffusion curve.^ To date, however, no one has 
examined how price stabilization programs affect the types of technologies that are 
adopted or the rate of diffusion of new technologies. That there should be some 
relationship between price stability and technology adoption is clear. The adoption 
of new technologies involves risk, and price stabilization programs are designed to 
remove risk. Also, some technologies are riskier than others. It seems reasonable 
to hypothesize that producers will rank new technologies differently under different 
price regimes. 
Figure 6.1 plots the wheat yield per acre for selected countries for the past three 
decades. Wheat yields in France and the United Kingdom have been increasing at a 
^For example, Choi and Johnson (1987), Gilbert (1986), Helms (1985), Mas-
sell (1966), Oi (1961), Rogerson (1980), Samuelson (1972), Turnovsky (1974, 1976), 
Turnovsky, Shalit, and Schmitz (1980), and Waugh (1944). 
^For example, Feder (1980, 1982), Hiebert (1974), Jenson (1982, 1983), Just and 
Zilberman (1983), and Stoneman (1981). 
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Figure 6.1: Wheat yield per harvested hectare for various countries 
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faster rate than have those in Canada and Australia. In fact, the data indicate that 
wheat yields in Australia have not improved. It is interesting to note that the rate 
of growth of wheat yields in the United Kingdom picked up after its entry into the 
European Community (EC) in 1973 and that the rate of growth for France, which 
has been a member of the EC for a much longer period, is more stable. 
Without further information, it is difficult to determine whether these changes 
are the result of movements along the supply curve or whether they reiiect differences 
in technology adoption. It is possible, for example, that Australian researchers have 
improved yields at a rate similar to those in France and that the lack of yield im­
provement reflects lower fertilizer use or the use of lower-quality land. If one accepts 
the view that the EC has successfully stabilized prices via its intervention system and 
that producers in Australia and Canada have been open to the world market, then 
it also seems possible that these divergent rates of growth result from differences in 
output price variation. 
Figure 6.2 presents information on the milk yield per cow in selected countries. 
Because the United Kingdom and Ireland joined the EC simultaneously and milk 
producers in The Netherlands and in the United States have had relatively stable 
output prices, we can see that these data lend support to the hypothesis that price-
stabilization programs tend to increase "yields." 
6.2 Definitions 
To examine these concepts more formally, we must define yield-increasing and 
cost-reducing technological changes. We define technological change in a manner 
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Figure 6.2: Milk yield per cow for various countries 
that is tractable and yet that will produce results that are directly interprétable. 
From this perspective, one might group together those technologies that are biased 
against land or other fixed assets. A useful alternative grouping would include those 
technologies that reduce the variable costs of production per unit of output. These 
we call cost-reducing technologies. 
The concepts of yield-increasing and cost-reducing technologies, while frequently 
discussed by lay groups, are often poorly defined. This chapter uses definitions that 
are intuitive, have applications in most agricultural enterprises, and are consistent 
with economic theory. Several intuitive examples of the difference between these 
types of technological change are discussed next. 
In the area of livestock, for example, research activities that focus on increasing 
hog litter size or on the development of expensive confinement facilities to increase 
the rate of gain or of survival might be termed yield increasing. Research that focuses 
on feed efficiency or on genetic selection for animals that can thrive outdoors or on 
males whose offspring create fewer birthing difficulties might be termed cost reducing. 
In horticulture, research on glass-house production can be compared with research 
on the development of frost- or disease-resistant varieties that can be grown without 
the protection of glass houses. For crops, research on winter wheat production that 
requires nitrogen top-dressings and several applications of pesticides and herbicides 
can be contrasted with the development of spring wheat strains that can grow without 
fertilizer. Other comparisons might be made between irrigation and summer fallow 
research or between research on soil drainage and on soil tilth aimed at increasing the 
number of acres tilled per man hour. 
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The concepts of yield-increasing and cost-reducing technologies have several im­
mediate applications in policy analysis. For example, governments wishing to en­
hance the international competitiveness of their agricultural sectors should encourage 
cost-reducing technologies. Those government with fears about food security should 
encourage yield-increasing research. In developing economies, it might sometimes 
be beneficial to increase food production via the yield-increasing technologies of the 
Green Revolution, whereas, in other situations, technologies that result in cheap food 
and high wages for those employed in the agricultural sector might be more desirable. 
The concepts also have implications for environmental economics. Many of the ad­
ditional inputs on a fixed land base required for yield-increasing technologies can be 
harmful to the environment. Examples include nitrogen and pesticide contamination 
of water, salinity problems with irrigated soils, and waste-disposal problems with in­
tensive livestock confinement operations. Cost-reducing technologies will, in general, 
require less input use and will involve the development of varieties of animals and 
plants that are native to a particular area. As such, cost-reducing technologies might 
reduce some environmental problems. 
Farm labor can be regarded as a fixed cost when family members are involved 
or as a variable cost when wages are paid. Cost-reducing technologies increase the 
marginal-value product of hired labor, and yield-increasing technologies increase the 
marginal-value product of family labor. The choice of yield-increasing or cost-reducing 
technologies will therefore have implications for both farm size and the institutional 
structure of agricultural firms. 
The dichotomy between cost-reducing and yield-increasing technologies is ob­
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viously a simplistic way to categorize technological change. Many changes exhibit 
aspects of both. The more formal analysis presented here uses only the two sim­
plistic definitions. The inclusion of technologies that have both yield-increasing and 
cost-reducing effects would needlessly complicate the derivations. 
6.2.1 Definition of yield-increasing and cost-reducing technologies 
A technological innovation is said to be yield increasing if it produces a higher 
yield per acre (animal) and does not reduce optimal variable costs per acre (animal). 
A technological innovation is said to be cost reducing if it reduces optimal variable 
costs per acre (animal) but does not increase yields per acre (animal). 
The adoption of yield-increasing technologies implies variable- inputs-using tech­
nical change, whereas the adoption of cost-reducing technologies implies variable-
inputs-saving technical change. 
These two types of technological change have similar effects on the profit function: 
Both reduce average total costs and therefore increase profits, but the source of these 
cost reductions is different. Yield-increasing technologies reduce the average fixed 
cost, whereas cost-reducing technologies reduce the average variable cost. As we shall 
see, these effects lead to different supply responses under price uncertainty for risk-
averse producers. The intuition here can be developed with the following analogy. 
Canadian wheat farmers are endowed with land and some labor. The purchase of 
fertilizer in this case is similar to the purchase of a lottery ticket with which the 
payoff is related to total revenue. The number of "tickets" purchased will depend 
on the expected variability of returns and on the individual's risk aversion. The 
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variance of returns is directly related to the number of tickets purchased because 
return variance is equal to the number of tickets squared times the variance on an 
individual purchase. The decision about the number of acres to plant is a less risky 
proposition than a lottery, especially if the opportunity cost of land and labor is low. 
Apart from the seed, producers will not regret incurring fixed costs, even in bad years. 
In bad years, however, the producer may wish that he or she had used less fertilizer 
or had simply planted the seed without fertilizer (i.e., purchased fewer tickets). The 
greater the price risk, the less willing producers will be to adopt technologies that 
require more variable costs and the more willing they will be to adopt technologies 
that reduce variable costs. This is because yield-increasing technologies force them 
to purchase more "lottery tickets," whereas cost-reducing technologies reduce this 
number. 
6.3 The Model 
This study employs and modifies the microeconomic model developed by Just 
and Zilberman (1983). Consider the decisions made by the owner of a single farm 
with fixed landholdings, L, with a sale price of Pi who uses a traditional technology, 
Tq. Assume that the farmer discovers two technological innovations; one which is 
yield increasing, T^, and the other which is cost-reducing, Also assume that the 
farmer must allocate the landholdings between technology 1 and technology 2. [The 
traditional technology {Tq) will never be preferred.] 
Let represent net returns per acre for technology i  at time t .  This equation 
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can be represented as 
Ht = Pt^it - for ^ = 0, 1, and 2, 
where P is unit price of output, Y is yield per acre, G[.] represents the variable cost 
function, and w is a vector of variable input prices. By definition, > Y2t = 
and Cn > Cq^ > C2t- Also assume that output price is the only random variable 
with known mean, P, and variance, . 
Now assume that the producer has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, 
£ / ' [ . ] ,  d e f i n e d  o n  w e a l t h ,  i n  w h i c h  >  0  a n d  f / "  <  0 .  E n d - o f - h a r v e s t  w e a l t h ,  W f ,  
can be written as the sum of the land value and the profitability from farming. 
Wt = P/I + Lii-Kii- + L2tT^2t^ 
where is the amount of land allocated to technology i at time t. Note that if 
adoption costs are zero, the farmer will not use the old technology. 
The a priori land allocation decision is determined by maximizing the following 
objective function with respect to Lu, L2t-
Max V{Ln,L2t) = EU[PiL-^ Lit'Kit +L2f^2t\^ (6.1) 
subject to Lu + L2t = L, 
^ 0. 
The first-order condition for land allocation is 
^ = E{u'(wit - %)l = Elu'{Pt{Yit -%)- (Clf - C2()}1 = 0. (6.2) 
Specifying a first-order Taylor series approximation to U^{W) yields 
U' (W)  =  U ' (W)  +  U"(W)[ (P t  -  P tWi t I  +  {Yu  -  Y2t )Ln}] ,  (6.3) 
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and using this approximation in (6.2), the following expression is obtained. 
U'{W) dLit " - Y2t) -  - <^2t) (6.4) 
= 0. 
—U^HW) 
where (j) = Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion at mean 
wealth. 
The approximation of the first-order condition, (6.4), can be solved for the opti­
mal level of and 
* PtO''lt-^2t) ~ ^2t) - ^ '^pt^2tiX\t~^2t)^ 
^2t - (6-6) 
Note that as or (j) tends to zero, will tend to L for as long as PtO^lt ~ ^2t) > 
- ^2t)- Also, if Pt{yit - %) - {Cit - C2t) is less than <t>o'piY2t{Yit - >2^)1, 
then the producer will allocate all of his land to the cost-reducing technology. As­
suming that neither of these conditions is true, we can see that the proportion of 
the land allocated to the yield-increasing technology is inversely proportional to the 
degree of price variability, cr^^. The opposite is true for cost-reducing technologies. 
This relationship suggests the following proposition. 
Proposition 10; Under the assumptions specified, as price variability decreases, ce­
teris paribus, the proportion of land devoted to fixed-inputs-saving (yield-increasing) 
technologies will increase. Consequently, the proportion of land devoted to variable-
inputs-saving (cost-reducing) technologies will decrease. 
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Corollary 7: As price variability increases, the proportion of land devoted to variable-
input-saving technologies will increase, whereas the proportion devoted to fixed-input-
saving technologies will decrease. 
This proposition tells us that, under the conditions outlined, increases in price 
variability will encourage the adoption of cost-reducing technologies or variable-
inputs-saving technologies. Reductions in the level of price variability will lead pro­
ducers to favor yield-increasing or fixed-factor-saving technological change. Note that 
this result follows even when the two technologies have similar yield-risk effects. The 
result depends not on yield risk but on the heteroscedastic nature of return risk based 
on the yield per fixed acre. 
6.4 The Introduction of Adjustment Costs 
One obvious extension of the outlined model is to introduce positive adjustment 
costs. Stoneman (1981) developed an intrafirm diffusion model under uncertainty 
that can be readily adopted to this purpose. Assume that the cost of adjustment, 
of technology i at time t is related to the rate of change in according to 
Ait = («.7) 
Assuming that adjustment costs for the second alternative technology are zero, the 
first-order condition (6.4) can be rewritten as 
U'(W) dLu " (6.8) 
-<l>o'pi[Y2t{Yit - Y2t)L + {Yii - Y^t)^L^] = 0. 
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If the firm chooses given the rate of adoption can be derived from (6.7) 
and (6.8). 
è[^'^t^^lt-y2t)-iClt-C2t) (6.9) 
i l  
-'i>4ty2t(yu - i2i)ii(i - 7^)-
Solving (6.9) for gives 
1  +  EXPi -a i t - / 3 i y  
where 
«1 = - %) - - ^2t) - (6.11) 
and equals the log of Zj at time zero; that is, when the producer discovers the 
technology divided by the difference between and the initial level: 
h = log —• (6.12) 
L^t - ^ 10 
Note that if > 0, the intrafirm diffusion process will be logistic, even though no 
learning mechanism is incorporated. This result is in agreement with most studies of 
this process, which have found that new technologies tend to be adopted in a sigmoid 
pattern through time. The result is also consistent with Stoneman's (1981) result 
in which he generates a logistic diffusion curve in the case in which only one new 
technology is available. 
By using an adjustment cost function, Stoneman's (1981) model, however, con­
siders the diffusion path of a single technology. It is therefore useful to see whether 
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the result can be repeated when the producer might choose between two technologies. 
If we repeat the above analysis for the second technology, we get 
^2^ = l + ^ ;jtP(a2<-/?2)' 
where 
^2 = ~ %) ~ (^1< ~ ^2f) - (6.14) 
and 
02 = log r* • (6.15) 
^2t ~ ^20 
Note that to motivate the existence of a standard logistic diffusion process, 02 must 
be negative. The variable aj in logistic curve (6.10) is directly proportional to the 
speed of diffusion.^ Whereas the variable 0=2 in (6.13) is the inverse of the speed of 
diffusion, obviously Cp is negatively related to oii and «2. This result leads to the 
following proposition and corollary. 
Proposition 11: A lower level of price variability will increase the speed of diffusion 
for the yield-increasing technology. 
Corollary 8: A higher level of price variability will increase the speed of diffusion 
for the cost-reducing technology. 
This proposition implies that price stabilization policies increase the diffusion 
rate of yield-increasing technologies and reduce the speed of diffusion of cost-reducing 
^See Mansfield (1966) and Stoneman (1981). 
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technologies. 
The above propositions and corollaries can be explained by Figures 6.3 and 6.4. 
Assuming that only yield-increasing technologies need adjustment costs and that 
aj > 0, Figure 6.3 shows that a logistic curve for yield-increasing technology diffusion 
can be drawn. L2t will be a declining curve, and a lower level of will raise 
and the speed of diffusion of yield-increasing technologies. Thus, variable-input-using 
technological change occurs. 
Figure 6.4 shows that, if only cost-reducing technologies need adjustment costs 
and if ag is negative, the speed of diffusion for cost-reducing technologies 
increase and decreases as goes up. This result implies variable-input-saving 
technological change. 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter provides some results concerning technology adoption patterns and 
technological change for two innovations that are assumed to be introduced simul­
taneously: one yield increasing, the other cost reducing. The analysis assumes that 
the output price is the only random variable and that the farmer is risk averse. The 
results show that a higher level of price variability will be one of the reasons for 
variable-inputs-saving technological change. On the other hand, a lower level of price 
variability will lead to variable-inputs-using technological change. 
The relationship between price variability and the speed of technology diffusion 
can also be determined by this model. The result is that a higher level of price 
variability will be associated with a low (high) speed of diffusion for yield-increasing 
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Figure 6.3: Dynamic path with aj > 0 and adjustment costs in yield-increasing 
technology adoption > a^i{b)] 
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0 t 
Figure 6.4: Dynamic path with 02 < 0 and adjustment costs in cost-reducing tech­
nology adoption < (T^iid)] 
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(cost-reducing) technology. 
An important implication of this chapter is the linkage between government price 
stabilization policies and technology adoption and technological change. A tentative 
conclusion is that the introduction of a price-stabilization policy will encourage pro­
ducers to adopt yield-increasing technologies and that the discontinuation of a price-
stabilization program will increase the development and adoption of cost-reducing 
technologies. This conclusion implies that countries wishing to develop or encour­
age the adoption of technologies that increase the productivities of the fixed factors 
of production (yield increasing) may find that price stabilization programs work for 
them. On the other hand, countries that wish to encourage the adoption of technolo­
gies that reduce average variable costs and purchased-input use (cost reducing) may 
find that price stabilization programs work against them. 
It may also be noted that the framework of this chapter also suggests some 
interesting empirical possibilities. The survey data for individual farms may be useful 
to undertake meaningful empirical work. 
7. SUMMARY 
In. economics, issues associated with technical and technological change are so 
manifold that still numerous questions remain to be answered. As a result, further 
explorations in this topic are possible and desirable to increase the economic welfare 
of society. The main issues of this dissertation are those problems that are related to 
technical and technological change under uncertainty; one issue is the factor bias of 
technical change under uncertainty, and the other is the technology adoption under 
price uncertainty. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief review of the theory of technical change and technology 
adoption. The review of literature indicated that the effect of uncertainty on the bias 
of technical change has not been investigated. Thus, the first issue examined in this 
dissertation is how uncertainty may affect the factor bias of technical change. This 
issue is examined in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. The literature review also indicated that 
there have been no analyses of how government price stabilization programs influence 
the type of technologies that are adopted or the rate of diffusion of new technologies. 
The second issue, therefore, is to discover the relationship between price variability 
and technology adoption and diffusion. This issue is examined in Chapter 6. 
Uncertainty might exist in the market or in the production process itself. As­
suming price uncertainty, the theory of endogenous technical progress is extended. 
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Chapter 3 shows that uncertainty in input prices will affect the bias of technical 
change. It is shown that the Hicksian proposition can be justified in both the deter­
ministic case and in the case of a risk-neutral firm. Assuming that the elasticity of 
substitution is greater than one, if a risk-averse firm faces input price uncertainty, en­
dogenous technical change will be biased toward the input that has the more certain 
price. This result implies that, even if the growth rates are different among input 
prices, Hicks-neutral technical change is possible. 
Output price uncertainty does not affect the direction of technical change bias 
but does affect the degree of bias. If uncertainty exists in an input and output 
price, the contemporaneous correlation coefficient plays an important role in the rate 
of technical change bias. If the elasticity of substitution is greater than one and the 
output price and input price are insignificantly and positively correlated or negatively 
correlated, technical change may be biased toward the input that has a certain price. 
On the contrary, if the prices are significantly and positively correlated, technical 
change may be biased toward the input that has an uncertain price. 
An important result of this chapter is that a firm will conduct research to increase 
the productivity of the inputs whose prices are less variable. This intuitive proposition 
is testable and has some policy implications. Governments can and often do influence 
the prices of inputs. This influence occurs via market intervention or through the 
legislative process. To the extent that our assumptions are valid, these policies will 
affect technical progress. Governments that wish to maximize labor productivity may 
find that relaxation of interest rates and currency stabilization policies works in their 
favor. 
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Chapter 4 investigates the impact of production uncertainty on the bias of tech­
nical change. Inputs are characterized from arguments of the standard deviation func­
tion. The results show that, assuming that the elasticity of substitution is greater 
than one, technical change will be biased toward risk-reducing inputs and against 
risk-increasing inputs. It is aJso shown that the degree of bias would be increased 
as the riskiness increases or as the firm becomes more risk averse. From a policy 
perspective, the principal conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that 
production uncertainty will influence the types of technology that are developed and 
adopted. Also, the results suggest that research should concentrate on technologies 
that reduce risk in regions where production uncertainty is high. 
Chapter 5 attempts to incorporate hedging or forward contracts into the model. 
The results show that, under output price uncertainty, the existence of forward mar­
kets has no effect on the direction of technical change bias but it affects the degree of 
bias. It is also shown that, under input and output price uncertainty, if the forward 
market is unbiased and the elasticity of substitution is greater than one, then tech­
nical change will be biased toward the input that has a certain price. By comparing 
these results with the results of Chapter 3, we can conclude that the activation of 
forward markets influences technical progress. 
Chapter 6 provides some results concerning the relationship between price un­
certainty and technology adoption patterns and the relationship between price un­
certainty and technological change for two innovations that are simultaneously in­
troduced. It is concluded that a higher level of price variability will be one of the 
reasons for variable-input-saving technological change. On the other hand, a lower 
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level of price variability will lead to variable-input-using technological change. It is 
also shown that a higher level of price variability will decrease the speed of diffusion for 
a yield-increasing technology and increase that for a cost-reducing technology. These 
results imply that the introduction of a price stabilization program will encourage pro­
ducers to adopt yield-increasing technologies and that the discontinuation of a price 
stabilization program will increase the development and adoption of cost-reducing 
technologies. 
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the development 
of the theories of technical change and technology adoption. Some implications for 
policy makers and researchers are included. An overall conclusion is that some re­
lationships between uncertainty and technical or technological change should exist. 
Also, the results might explain regional differences for technical change bias and the 
technology diffusion process. Thus, policy makers and researchers should recognize 
these relationships and endeavor to find regional uncertainty factors. 
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8. APPENDIX 
8.1 Itô Control Model 
In economics, the Itô control model is becoming popular for theoretical modeling 
in continuous time because little realism is sacrificed for a gain in analytical power. 
In this section, Itô differentiation and dynamic programming for a vector of state 
equations^ are briefly sketched for convenience in following the derivations in Chapters 
3, 4, and 5. 
Suppose that a vector of state variables is assumed to evolve in a continuous 
stochastic manner according to 
dS = 8{t,S,C)dt-V(T{t,S,C)dz, (8.1) 
where 5 is a vector of state variables (mxl), ^ is a vector of the expected change 
function in the state (mxl), <7 is a matrix of the standard deviation function (mxn), 
C represents a vector of control variables (pxl), and z denotes a vector of Wiener 
processes (nxl). 
^Refer to Arnold (1974), Hertzler (1987), Kamien and Schwartz (1981, Chapter 
21), Malliaris and Brock (1982), and Mangel (1985) for a detailed discussion of Itô 
differentiation and dynamic programming. 
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8.1.1 Itô differentiation 
Suppose that the variable D is a function of time and the stochastic state vari­
ables, D — G(t,S)^ then the vector formula of Itô differentiation is obtained as 
m -i m m 
dD = Gtdi + Gs^dSi+ -•£•£(8.2) 
t=l 
m 1 m m 
= ^ G3^sj{<3'^<^^)ij]dt 
i=l "^1=1 j=l 
m 
+ 11 G3-{(Tdz)i, 
i=l 
where S~  is the element of the S  vector, Gs-  and Gs-s -  are first and second I 1 J 
partial derivatives of G with respect to elements of the S vector, (5)j- represents the 
element of the 6 vector, A is the contemporaneous correlation matrix, 
is the element of the mxm covariance matrix, (rA.a\ and (cdz)^ denotes the 
element of the mxl vector, crdz. 
8.1.2 Dynamic programming 
Assume that a firm chooses a vector of control variables to maximize its expected 
discounted utility, subject to (8.1), which represents the change in the state variables. 
The objective function may be written as 
J(So) = Max E[J^ e-'-*U(St,Ct) dt + e-''<F(5r)|5o = sqI-
The Itô version of the Bellman equation will be 
m -I m m 
0 = + Max + E Jsi{S)i + 2 E E JsiSjWI^Aih 
i=l z=lj=l 
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where Js^ and are partial derivatives of J with respect to elements of the S 
vector. 
The stochastic Hamiltonian for a vector of state variables is 
m 1 m m 
H = e-'-tu + E + r X: E (8,3) 
2=1  ^ i= l j= l  •' 
To choose the controls, C, partially differentiate H. 
m 
Hc = 0 = e-'-'Uc + E (8.4) 
2 = 1 
m m m 
+ n J3isAcrA)in]{(rc)i, 
^ j=l •' 
where is the partial derivative of utility with respect to the control variables and 
{Sc){ and are the partial derivatives. 
By substituting the optimal controls into the Bellman equation, it can be con­
verted to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. 
m 
2= 1  .  
•> m m I 
,=U=t  
where * represents the optimum value. 
By Itô differentiating the marginal indirect utility, Js{t,S), and substituting the 
partial differentiation of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation with respect to S into the Itô 
differentiation of the marginal indirect utility, another group of first-order conditions, 
that is, the evolution of the marginal utility of the state variables, may be obtained. 
m 
àJsj^ = -[e ^ Usj^ + (8.5) 
2 = 1 
93 
mm m 
+ E E E JsiSj{cr^)jni<^3j^)i]dt 
i=lj—l j=l  
m 
+ E Jsk3i{<rdz)i, 
t= l  
where 7^^, and represent derivatives with respect to Sj^. 
Therefore, a complete set of first-order conditions characterizes the optimal con­
trols (8.4), the evolution of the state variables (8.1), and the evolution of the marginal 
utility of the state variables (8.5). 
8.2 The Bias of Technical Change 
The relationship between the Hicks definition of technical change bias and factor 
augmentation was derived by Kamien and Schwartz (1969). In this section, the result 
is summarized for convenience. 
The absolute value of the slope of iso-quant can be derived as 
^  =  Z ( A ,  B ,  X i ,  X 2 ) ,  (8.6) 
where Z es defined by (8.6). The change in the slope of the iso-quant through a given 
point due to factor augmentation may be obtained as 
-( 
dt ^ 
Differentiating (8.6) with respect to ^4 yields 
(8.8) dZ B M = (^(^^1^1^21 - ^ ^^1^2^11 - fifg) 
= ^^^1^1^21 + BX2F2F12 - F1F2) (8.9) 
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A2 
^^21 A _ 
. [ FF12J 
=  ^ ^ 2  ( I -  e \  
A^Fi \ e ; ' 
(8.10) 
(8.11) 
where e is the elasticity of substitution (e = ). Equation (8.9) can obtained 
by making use of the fact that is homogeneous of degree zero. Also, the linear 
homogeneity of F is utilized to get (8.10). 
By using the same procedure, it can be established that 
^ = _J2_ flZL!) 
dB \ e ) (8.12) 
An explicit equation may be obtained by substituting (8.11) and (8.12) into (8.7). 
ÇI = j^{F2BlFiA) l -e(À A _ £ \  
A  B J '  
(8.13) 
F2BI Fi  A e 
where 0 is technical change bias. Technical change is -using (-,Y2-saving) if < 0 
and -saving (^2'^sing) if fi > 0. Hicks-neutral technical change may be defined 
as f2 = 0. 
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